Zašto se srpski zvaničnici ustežu od ideološkog svrstavanja i kuda nas to vodi

odakle vam podatak da se u iranu limitiraju ljudska prava??? oni mozda na drugaciji nacin gledaju na zivot i sta bi im se nesto nametalo.

Idite u Rusiju i Kinu i vidite da nije bas tako

Uostalom tesko nesto Srbija moze prodati Americi, ali zato Rusiji i Kini ima sta da ponudi

Goran Nikolić

mislim da strah od pogresne strateske orijentacije pokazuje brigu za drustvo, ali ja sam optimista, nova Vlada mi je povod, ali, pre svega, neumitni procesi

antioksidant

Goran Nikolić

mislim da strah od pogresne strateske orijentacije pokazuje brigu za drustvo, ali ja sam optimista, nova Vlada mi je povod, ali, pre svega, neumitni procesi

Nova vlada je povod za optimizam?

Jelena Milić

mislim da goran daje dovoljno refernci i arguemnata u prilog svojim tezama i zaista ne vidim zasto ponovo radis takve stvari u komentarima i time diskvlaifikujes, bar u mojim ocima, vrlo zanimljiva razmisljanja koja i sam postujes. vlada sa ds je bolja od vlade bez ds. kao se secam i ldp je u pocetku nudio saradnju bt.

ps gorane ovo nije odbrana vas, vi to svojim argumentima radite sasvim dobro, vec moja rasprava sa dragom.

The terrible consequence of the Bush-Blair global misadventure is to have undermined what remaining support there was for western notions of liberal democracy. Countries that lecture about universal values do not deserve to be listened to if they indulge in rendition flights and torture.

The Clinton scam is symptomatic of the death of liberalism - not its narcissistic, war-loving wing ("humanitarian intervention", which is ascendant, but the liberalism that speaks against crimes committed in its name, while extending rungs of the economic ladder to those below. It was Clinton's promotion of the former and crushing of the latter that so inspired new Labour's "project". Clinton, not Bush, was Cool Britannia's true Ma fia godfather.

Jelena Milić

...( vrlo zanimljiva pozicija i kritika sinofobije u poslovnoj americi i
objasnjenje da li je za sad strasno, po nemu nije, sto kina kupuje
obveznice)

Goran Nikolić

Tacno, sukob nikad nije bio manje moguc. SAD ipak, vode svet.

July 7, 2007

Putin ‘Narrowly’ Averts US Nuclear Armageddon

By: Sorcha Faal, and as reported to her Western SubscribersRussian Military Analysts are reporting today that this past weeks ‘Sudden-Summit’ between Presidents Putin and Bush in the United States has ‘narrowly averted an American nuclear Armageddon’ in which the Americans were planning a massive atomic strike upon Iran.

Putin was advised immediately prior to the ‘Sudden-Summit’ by Russian Military Commanders that the United States had issued the orders for a nuclear strike on Iran, and which has been further confirmed by the Washington Times News Service, and as we can read:

"International radio operators picked up large numbers of coded Air Force communications being sent around the world on June 26 that indicated some type of military activity was about to take place.

A U.S. military official said the radio traffic was monitored from the Air Force Global High Frequency System (GHFS) that some observers regarded as "extraordinary" because of the unprecedented length of messages. They were sent to Air Force commanders at Andrews Air Force Base; Wideawake Airfield on Ascension Island; Elmendorf Air Force Base, Alaska; Andersen Air Force Base, Guam; Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii; Lajes Field in the Azores; Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska; Salinas Air Base, Puerto Rico; Thule Air Base, Greenland; and Yokota Air Base, Japan. All are sites of GHFS ground stations.

The messages appeared to be emergency action messages, coded communications sent by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to U.S. Air Force strategic nuclear forces.

The messages sent June 26 included 174 characters, much longer than normal 30-character messages, and amateur radio monitors say they have not seen the size of this message since the 1991 Persian Gulf War."

Of great concern to the American War Leaders, also, is the impending invasion of Iraq by fellow NATO Member Turkey, and as we can read as reported by the International Herald Tribune:

"Turkey's government and military have agreed on detailed plans for a cross-border operation against Kurdish rebels based in northern Iraq, the foreign minister said Friday.

Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul urged the United States and Iraq, which oppose a Turkish military move into Iraq, to crack down on rebels of the Kurdistan Workers' Party, or PKK. But he said Turkey was ready to stage an offensive if necessary.

"We have decided how to act, everything is clear," Gul told private NTV television. "We know what to do and when to do it," he said without providing details."

Jelena Milić

evo jedne instutcije cije
radove redovno pratim.

The Eurasian Chessboard
by Zbigniew Brzezinski
Chapter 2, The Grand Chessboard
Chart 1 - The Continents: Area
Chart 2 - The Continents: Population
Chart 3 - The Continents: GNP
For America, the chief geopolitical prize is Eurasia. For half a millennium, world
affairs were dominated by Eurasian powers and peoples who fought with one
another for regional domination and reached out for global power. Now a non-
Eurasian power is preeminent in Eurasia -- and America's global primacy is
directly dependent on how long and how effectively its preponderance on the
Eurasian continent is sustained.
Obviously, that condition is temporary. But its duration, and what follows it, is of
critical importance not only to America's well-being but more generally to
international peace. The sudden emergence of the first and only global power has
created a situation in which an equally quick end to its supremacy -- either
because of America's withdrawal from the world or because of the sudden
emergence of a successful rival -- would produce massive international instability.
In effect, it would prompt global anarchy. The Harvard political scientist Samuel
P. Huntington is right in boldly asserting: A world without U.S. primacy will be a
world with more violence and disorder and less democracy and economic growth
than a world where the United States continues to have more influence than any
other country in shaping global affairs. The sustained international primacy of the
United States is central to the welfare and security of Americans and to the future
of freedom, democracy, open economies, and international order in the world.(1)
In that context, how America "manages" Eurasia is critical. Eurasia is the globe's
largest continent and is geopolitically axial. A power that dominates Eurasia would
control two of the world's three most advanced and economically productive
regions. A mere glance at the map also suggests that control over Eurasia would
almost automatically entail Africa's subordination, rendering the Western
Hemisphere and Oceania geopolitically peripheral to the world's central continent.
About 75 percent of the world's people live in Eurasia, and most of the world's
physical wealth is there as well, both in its enterprises and underneath its soil.
Eurasia accounts for about 60 percent of the world's GNP and about three-fourths
of the world's known energy resources (see Tables).
Eurasia is also the location of most of the world's politically assertive and dynamic
states. Alter the United States, the next six largest economies and the next six
biggest spenders on military weaponry are located in Eurasia. All but one of the
world's overt nuclear powers and all but one of the covert ones are located in
Eurasia. The world's two most populous aspirants to regional hegemony and
global influence are Eurasian. All of the potential political and/or economic
challengers to American primacy are Eurasian. Cumulatively, Eurasia's power
vastly overshadows America's. Fortunately for America, Eurasia is too big to be
politically one.
Eurasia is thus the chessboard on which the struggle for global primacy continues
to be played. Although geostrategy -- the strategic management of geopolitical
interests -- may be compared to chess, the somewhat oval-shaped Eurasian
chessboard engages not just two but several players, each possessing differing
amounts of power. The key players are located on the chessboard's west, east,
center, and south. Both the western and the eastern extremities of the
chessboard contain densely populated regions, organized on relatively congested
space into several powerful states. In the case of Eurasia's small western
periphery, American power is deployed directly on it. The far eastern mainland is
the seat of an increasingly powerful and independent player, controlling an
enormous population, while the territory of its energetic rival -- confined on
several nearby islands -- and half of a small far-eastern peninsula provide a perch
for American power.
Stretching between the western and eastern extremities is a sparsely populated
and currently politically fluid and organizationally fragmented vast middle space
that was formerly occupied by a powerful rival to US preeminence -- a rival that
was once committed to the goal of pushing America out of Eurasia. To the south
of that large central Eurasian plateau lies a politically anarchic but energy-rich
region of potentially great importance to both the western and the eastern
Eurasian states, including in the southernmost area a highly populated aspirant to
regional hegemony.
This huge, oddly shaped Eurasian chessboard -- extending from Lisbon to
Vladivostok -- provides the setting for 'the game." If the middle space can be
drawn increasingly into the expanding orbit of the West (where America
preponderates), if the southern region is not subjected to domination by a single
player, and if the East is not unified in a manner that prompts the expulsion of
America from its offshore bases, America can then be said to prevail. But if the
middle space rebuffs the West, becomes an assertive single entity, and either
gains control over the South or forms an alliance with the major Eastern actor,
then America's primacy in Eurasia shrinks dramatically. The same would be the
case if the two major Eastern players were somehow to unite. Finally, any
election of America by its Western partners from its perch on the western
periphery would automatically spell the end of America's participation in the game
on the Eurasian chessboard, even though that would probably also mean the
eventual subordination of the western extremity to a revived player occupying the
middle space.
The scope of America's global hegemony is admittedly great, but its depth is
shallow, limited by both domestic and external restraints. American hegemony
involves the exercise of decisive influence but, unlike the empires of the past, not
of direct control. The very scale and diversity of Eurasia, as well as the power of
some of its states, limits the depth of American influence and the scope of control
over the course of events. That megacontinent is just too large, too populous,
culturally too varied, and composed of too many historically ambitious and
politically energetic states to be compliant toward even the most economically
successful and politically preeminent global power. This condition places a
premium on geostrategic skill, on the careful, selective, and very deliberate
deployment of America's resources on the huge Eurasian chessboard.
It is also a fact that America is too democratic at home to be autocratic abroad.
This limits the use of America's power, especially its capacity for military
intimidation. Never before has a populist democracy attained international
supremacy. But the pursuit of power is not a goal that commands popular
passion, except in conditions of a sudden threat or challenge to the public's sense
of domestic well-being. The economic self-denial (that is, defense spending) and
the human sacrifice (casualties even among professional soldiers) required in the
effort are uncongenial to democratic instincts. Democracy is inimical to imperial
mobilization.
Moreover, most Americans by and large do not derive any special gratification
from their country's new status as the sole global superpower. Political
"triumphalism' connected with America's victory in the Cold War has generally
tended to receive a cold reception and has been the object of some derision on
the part of the more liberal-minded commentators. If anything, two rather
varying views of the implications for America of its historic success in the
competition with the former Soviet Union have been politically more appealing:
on the one hand, there is the view that the end of the Cold War justifies a
significant reduction in America's global engagement, irrespective of the
consequences for America's global standing; and on the other hand, there is the
perspective that the time has come for genuine international multilateralism, to
which America should even yield some of its sovereignty. Both schools of thought
have commanded the loyalty of committed constituencies.
Compounding the dilemmas facing the American leadership are the changes in
the character of the global situation itself: the direct use of power now tends to
be more constrained than was the case in the past. Nuclear weapons have
dramatically reduced the utility of war as a tool of policy or even as a threat. The
growing economic interdependence among nations is making the political
exploitation of economic blackmail less compelling. Thus maneuver, diplomacy,
coalition building, co-optation, and the very deliberate deployment of one's
political assets have become the key ingredients of the successful exercise of
geostrategic power on the Eurasian chessboard.
Geopolitics and Geostrategy
The exercise of American global primacy must be sensitive to the fact that
political geography remains a critical consideration in international affairs.
Napoleon reportedly once said that to know a nation's geography was to know its
foreign policy. Our understanding of the importance of political geography,
however, must adapt to the new realities of power.
For most of the history of international affairs, territorial control was the focus of
political conflict. Either national self-gratification over the acquisition of larger
territory or the sense of national deprivation over the loss of "sacred" land has
been the cause of most of the bloody wars fought since the rise of nationalism. It
is no exaggeration to say that the territorial imperative has been the main
impulse driving the aggressive behavior of nation-states. Empires were also built
through the careful seizure and retention of vital geographic assets, such as
Gibraltar or the Suez Canal or Singapore, which served as key choke points or
linchpins in a system of imperial control.
The most extreme manifestation of the linkage between nationalism and
territorial possession was provided by Nazi Germany and imperial Japan. The
effort to build the "one-thousand-year Reich" went far beyond the goal of
reuniting all German-speaking peoples under one political roof and focused also
on the desire to control "the granaries" of Ukraine as well as other Slavic lands,
whose populations were to provide cheap slave labor for the imperial domain. The
Japanese were similarly fixated on the notion that direct territorial possession of
Manchuria, and later of the important oil-producing Dutch East Indies, was
essential to the fulfillment of the Japanese quest for national power and global
status. In a similar vein, for centuries the definition of Russian national greatness
was equated with the acquisition of territory, and even at the end of the twentieth
century, the Russian insistence on retaining control over such non-Russian people
as the Chechens, who live around a vital oil pipeline, has been justified by the
claim that such control is essential to Russia's status as a great power.
Nation-states continue to be the basic units of the world system. Although the
decline in big-power nationalism and the fading of ideology has reduced the
emotional content of global politics -- while nuclear weapons have introduced
major restraints on the use of force -- competition based on territory still
dominates world affairs, even if its forms currently tend to be more civil. In that
competition, geographic location is still the point of departure for the definition of
a nation-state's external priorities, and the size of national territory also remains
one of the major criteria of status and power.
However, for most nation-states, the issue of territorial possession has lately
been waning in salience. To the extent that territorial disputes are still important
in shaping the foreign policy of some states, they are more a matter of
resentment over the denial of self-determination to ethnic brethren said to be
deprived of the right to join the "motherland" or a grievance over alleged
mistreatment by a neighbor of ethnic minorities than they are a quest for
enhanced national status through territorial enlargement.
Increasingly, the ruling national elites have come to recognize that factors other
than territory are more crucial in determining the international status of a state or
the degree of its international influence. Economic prowess, and its translation
into technological innovation, can also be a key criterion of power. Japan provides
the supreme example. Nonetheless, geographic location still tends to determine
the immediate priorities of a state -- and the greater its military, economic, and
political power, the greater the radius, beyond its immediate neighbors, of that
state's vital geopolitical interests, influence, and involvement.
Until recently, the leading analysts of geopolitics have debated whether land
power was more significant than sea power and what specific region of Eurasia is
vital to gain control over the entire continent. One of the most prominent, Harold
Mackinder, pioneered the discussion early in this century with his successive
concepts of the Eurasian "pivot area" (which was said to include all of Siberia and
much of Central Asia) and, later, of the Central-East European "heartland" as the
vital springboards for the attainment of continental domination. He popularized
his heartland concept by the famous dictum:
Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland;
Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island;
Who rules the World-Island commands the world.
Geopolitics was also invoked by some leading German political geographers to
justify their country's "Drang nach Osten," notably with Karl Haushofer adapting
Mackinder's concept to Germany's strategic needs. Its much-vulgarized echo
could also be heard in Adolf Hitler's emphasis on the German people's need for
"Lebensraum." Other European thinkers of the first half of this century anticipated
an eastward shift in the geopolitical center of gravity, with the Pacific region --
and specifically America and Japan -- becoming the likely inheritors of Europe's
fading domination. To forestall such a shift, the French political geographer Paul
Demangeon, as well as other French geopoliticians, advocated greater unity
among the European states even before World War II.
Today, the geopolitical issue is no longer what geographic part of Eurasia is the
point of departure for continental domination, nor whether land power is more
significant than sea power. Geopolitics has moved from the regional to the global
dimension, with preponderance over the entire Eurasian continent serving as the
central basis for global primacy. The United States, a non-Eurasian power, now
enjoys international primacy, with its power directly deployed on three
peripheries of the Eurasian continent, from which it exercises a powerful influence
on the states occupying the Eurasian hinterland. But it is on the globe's most
important playing field -- Eurasia -- that a potential rival to America might at
some point arise. Thus, focusing on the key players and properly assessing the
terrain has to be the point of departure for the formulation of American
geostrategy for the long-term management of America's Eurasian geopolitical
interests.
Two basic steps are thus required:
*first, to identify the geostrategically dynamic Eurasian states that have the
power to cause a potentially important shift in the international distribution of
power and to decipher the central external goals of their respective political elites
and the likely consequences of their seeking to attain them; and to pinpoint the
geopolitically critical Eurasian states whose location and/or existence have
catalytic effects either on the more active geostrategic players or on regional
conditions;
* second, to formulate specific US policies to offset, co-opt, and/or control the
above, so as to preserve and promote vital US interests, and to conceptualize a
more comprehensive geostrategy that establishes on a global scale the
interconnection between the more specific US policies.
In brief, for the United States, Eurasian geostrategy involves the purposeful
management of geostrategically dynamic states and the careful handling of
geopolitically catalytic states, in keeping with the twin interests of America in the
short-term preservation of its unique global power and in the long-run
transformation of it into increasingly institutionalized global cooperation. To put it
in a terminology that hearkens back to the more brutal age of ancient empires,
the three grand imperatives of imperial geostrategy are to prevent collusion and
maintain security dependence among the vassals, to keep tributaries pliant and
protected, and to keep the barbarians from coming together.
...
Russia, it hardly needs saying, remains a major geostrategic player, in spite of its
weakened state and probably prolonged malaise. Its very presence impacts
massively on the newly independent states within the vast Eurasian space of the
former Soviet Union. It entertains ambitious geopolitical objectives, which it
increasingly proclaims openly. Once it has recovered its strength, it will also
impact significantly on its western and eastern neighbors. Moreover, Russia has
still to make its fundamental geostrategic choice regarding its relationship with
America: is it a friend or foe? It may well feel that it has major options on the
Eurasian continent in that regard. Much depends on how its internal politics
evolve and especially on whether Russia becomes a European democracy or a
Eurasian empire again. In any case, it clearly remains a player, even though it
has lost some of its "pieces," as well as some key spaces on the Eurasian
chessboard.
Similarly, it hardly needs arguing that China is a major player. China is already a
significant regional power and is likely to entertain wider aspirations, given its
history as a major power and its view of the Chinese state as the global center.
The choices China makes are already beginning to affect the geopolitical
distribution of power in Asia, while its economic momentum is bound to give it
both greater physical power and increasing ambitions. The rise of a "Greater
China" will not leave the Taiwan issue dormant, and that will inevitably impact on
the American position in the Far East. The dismantling of the Soviet Union has
also created on the western edge of China a series of states, regarding which the
Chinese leaders cannot be indifferent. Thus, Russia will also be much affected by
China's more active emergence on the world scene.
The eastern periphery of Eurasia poses a paradox. Japan is clearly a major power
in world affairs, and the American-Japanese alliance has often -- and correctly --
been defined as America's most important bilateral relationship. As one of the
very top economic powers in the world, Japan clearly possesses the potential for
the exercise of first-class political power. Yet it does not act on this, eschewing
any aspirations for regional domination and preferring instead to operate under
American protection. Like Great Britain in the case of Europe, Japan prefers not to
become engaged in the politics of the Asian mainland, though at least a partial
reason for this is the continued hostility of many fellow Asians to any Japanese
quest for a regionally preeminent political role.
...
...Iran, despite the ambiguity of its attitude
toward Azerbaijan, similarly provides stabilizing support for the new political
diversity of Central Asia. It dominates the eastern shoreline of the Persian Gulf,
while its independence, irrespective of current Iranian hostility toward the United
States, acts as a barrier to any long-term Russian threat to American interests in
the Persian Gulf region.
Finally, South Korea is a Far Eastern geopolitical pivot. Its close links to the
United States enable America to shield Japan and thereby to keep Japan from
becoming an independent and major military power, without an overbearing
American presence within Japan itself. Any significant change in South Korea's
status, either through unification and/or through a shift into an expanding
Chinese sphere of influence, would necessarily alter dramatically America's role in
the Far East, thus altering Japan's as well. In addition, South Korea's growing
economic power also makes it a more important "space" in its own right, control
over which becomes increasingly valuable.
The above list of geostrategic players and geopolitical pivots is neither permanent
nor fixed. At times, some states might have to be added or subtracted. Certainly,
in some respects, the case could be made that Taiwan, or Thailand, or Pakistan,
or perhaps Kazakstan or Uzbekistan should also be included in the latter
category. However, at this stage, the case for none of the above seems
compelling. Changes in the status of any of them would represent major events
and involve some shifts in the distribution of power, but it is doubtful that the
catalytic consequences would be far- reaching. The only exception might involve
the issue of Taiwan, if one chooses to view it apart from China. Even then, that
issue would only arise if China were to use major force to conquer the island, in
successful defiance of the United States, thereby threatening more generally
America's political credibility in the Far East. The probability of such a course of
events seems low, but that consideration still has to be kept in mind when
framing US policy toward China.
Critical Choices and Potential Challenges
The identification of the central players and key pivots helps to define America's
grand policy dilemmas and to anticipate the potential major challenges on the
Eurasian supercontinent. These can be summarized, before more comprehensive
discussion in subsequent chapters, as involving five broad issues:
* What kind of Europe should America prefer and hence promote?
*What kind of Russia is in America's interest, and what and how much can
America do about it?
*What are the prospects for the emergence in Central Eurasia of a new "Balkans,"
and what should America do to minimize the resulting risks?
*What role should China be encouraged to assume in the Far East, and what are
the implications of the foregoing not only for the United States but also for Japan?
*What new Eurasian coalitions are possible, which might be most dangerous to
US interests, and what needs to be done to preclude them?
The United States has always professed its fidelity to the cause of a united
Europe. Ever since the days of the Kennedy administration, the standard
invocation has been that of "equal partnership." Official Washington has
consistently proclaimed its desire to see Europe emerge as a single entity,
powerful enough to share with America both the responsibilities and the burdens
of global leadership.
Ambiguity regarding the degree of American support for European unity also
extends to the issue of how European unity is to be defined, especially concerning
which country, if any, should lead a united Europe. Washington has not
discouraged London's divisive posture regarding Europe's integration, though
Washington has also shown a clear preference for German -- rather than French
-- leadership in Europe. That Is understandable, given the traditional thrust of
French policy, but the preference has also had the effect of encouraging the
occasional appearance of a tactical Franco-British entente in order to thwart
Germany, as well as periodic French flirtation with Moscow in order to offset the
American-German coalition
In brief, a long-range American geostrategy for Europe will have to address
explicitly the issues of European unity and real partnership with Europe. An
America that truly desires a united and hence also a more independent Europe
will have to throw its weight behind those European forces that are genuinely
committed to Europe's political and economic integration. Such a strategy will
also mean junking the last vestiges of the once-hallowed U.S.-U.K. special
relationship.
A policy for a united Europe will also have to address -- though jointly with the
Europeans -- the highly sensitive issue of Europe's geographic scope. How far
eastward should the European Union extend? And should the eastern limits of the
EU be synonymous with the eastern front line of NATO? ....
The above quotations define well -- even though with some animus -- the
dilemma that the United States faces. To what extent should Russia be helped
economically -- which inevitably strengthens Russia politically and militarily -- and
to what extent should the newly independent states be simultaneously assisted in
the defense and consolidation of their independence? Can Russia be both
powerful and a democracy at the same time? If it becomes powerful again, will it
not seek to regain its lost imperial domain, and can it then be both an empire and
a democracy?
Another major uncertainty looms in the large and geopolitically fluid space of
Central Eurasia, maximized by the potential vulnerability of the Turkish-Iranian
pivots. In the area demarcated on the following map from Crimea in the Black
Sea directly eastward along the new southern frontiers of Russia, all the way to
the Chinese province of Xinjiang, then down to the Indian Ocean and thence
westward to the Red Sea, then northward to the eastern Mediterranean Sea and
back to Crimea, live about 400 million people, located in some twenty-five states,
almost all of them ethnically as well as religiously heterogeneous and practically
none of them politically stable. Some of these states may be in the process of
acquiring nuclear weapons.
This huge region, torn by volatile hatreds and surrounded by competing powerful
neighbors, is likely to be a major battlefield, both for wars among nation-states
and, more likely, for protracted ethnic and religious violence. Whether India acts
as a restraint or whether it takes advantage of some opportunity to impose its
will on Pakistan will greatly affect the regional scope of the likely conflicts. The
internal strains within Turkey and Iran are likely not only to get worse but to
greatly reduce the stabilizing role these states are capable of playing within this
volcanic region. Such developments will in turn make it more difficult to
assimilate the new Central Asian states into the international community, while
also adversely affecting the American-dominated security of the Persian Gulf
region. In any case, both America and the international community may be faced
here with a challenge that will dwarf the recent crisis in the former Yugoslavia.
A possible challenge to American primacy from Islamic fundamentalism could be
part of the problem in this unstable region. By exploiting religious hostility to the
American way of life and taking advantage of the Arab-lsraeli conflict, Islamic
fundamentalism could undermine several pro-Western Middle Eastern
governments and eventually jeopardize American regional interests, especially in
the Persian Gulf. However, without political cohesion and in the absence of a
single genuinely powerful Islamic state, a challenge from Islamic fundamentalism
would lack a geopolitical core and would thus be more likely to express itself
through diffuse violence.
A geostrategic issue of crucial importance is posed by China's emergence as a
major power. ...
...Henceforth, the United States may have to
determine how to cope with regional coalitions that seek to push America out of
Eurasia, thereby threatening America's status as a global power. However,
whether any such coalitions do or do not arise to challenge American primacy will
in fact depend to a very large degree on how effectively the United States
responds to the major dilemmas identified here.
Potentially, the most dangerous scenario would be a grand coalition of China,
Russia, and perhaps Iran, an "antihegemonic" coalition united not by ideology but
by complementary grievances.
... The currently dominant
American global system, within which "the threat of war is off the table," is likely
to be stable only in those parts of the world in which American primacy, guided
by a long-term geostrategy, rests on compatible and congenial sociopolitical
systems, linked together by American-dominated multilateral frameworks.

Russia restores Soviet-era strategic bomber patrols - Putin -2

Current nuclear threat worse than during Cold War - U.S. Expert -1
WASHINGTON, July 19 (RIA Novosti)

Army chief warns Poles: if you want U.S. shield,
buy gas masks

White House preparing to stage new September 11 - Reagan official
WASHINGTON, July 20 (RIA Novosti) - A former Reagan official has issued a
public warning that the Bush administration is preparing to orchestrate a staged
terrorist attack in the United States, transform the country into a dictatorship and
launch a war with Iran within a year.

Putin aide: 'Miliband's hatred for Russia runs in family'

In a speech in Germany - which some U.S. observers said smacked of Cold War rhetoric - Putin accused the United States of making the world a more dangerous place by pursuing policies aimed at making it "one single master."

Attacking the concept of a "unipolar" world in which the United States was the sole superpower, he said: "What is a unipolar world? No matter how we beautify this term, it means one single center of power, one single center of force and one single master."

"It has nothing in common with democracy because that is the opinion of the majority taking into account the minority opinion," he told the gathering of top security and defense officials.

"People are always teaching us democracy, but the people who teach us democracy don't want to learn it themselves," he said.

THE CORRIDORS OF POWER
Discussions at the 2007 Bilderberg Group meetings covered concerns over the World Bank presidency, Russia's muscle-flexing on energy issues and the failure of US-led NATO forces in Afghanistan.

Extracted from Nexus Magazine, Volume 14, Number 5 (August - September 2007)
PO Box 30, Mapleton Qld 4560 Australia. editor@nexusmagazine.com
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Relations with Russia

Another issue of great concern to both American and European Bilderbergers is Russia's current muscle-flexing on the issue of energy. The controversy over the TNK-BP licence, BP's Russian venture, is just one of many circumstances causing anger amongst the globalist elite.

One American Bilderberger said that after years of economic stagnation, "Russia is acting against unipolarity's accommodating ideologies and politics, against its recently resurgent manifestations and machinations, and against the instruments of its perpetuation, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation [NATO]".

Bilderberg 2007 served as a consensus-building exercise to decide on a common policy and strategy to deal with Russia's resurgence. In particular, Bilderberg is not at all happy with Russia's current strategy of actively dismantling what remains of "the atmosphere of acquiescence to America's will", in the words of one Bilderberger, which arose in the post-Soviet period and was absolutely crucial to the thriving of US-led unipolarity.

That was in the beginning of the 1990s, the early stages of the Yeltsin reign. With the wholesale looting of Russia in the 1990s through shock therapy and the loans-for-shares scheme, engineered by the socialist theoreticians at Harvard such as Jeffrey Sachs, Andrei Schliefer, David Lipton and Jonathan Hay, the country was brought into the dawn of the 21st century capitalist economy. As a result, Russia eventually toppled into anarchy, its population rendered desperate; its ability to support a world-class military establishment was smashed, which then made it inevitable that colonial behaviour would occur. That is exactly what George Ball was proposing during the Bilderberg 1968 meeting in Canada. I'll get back to Ball later in this section.

Incidentally, the term "shock therapy" refers to the sudden release of price and currency controls combined with the withdrawal of state subsidies and immediate trade liberalisation within a country-all the necessary ingredients for impoverishment of the society...in this case, Russia.

In Zbigniew Brzezinski's 1997 book The Grand Chessboard,1 "Russia" and "vital energy reserves", as it turns out, are mentioned more frequently than any other country and subject in the book. Brzezinski is President Carter's former National Security Advisor, a co-founder of the Trilateral Commission, a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the Bilderberg Club and a close associate of David Rockefeller and Henry Kissinger. He is the proverbial insider's insider. According to Brzezinski, global US and thus Bilderberg hegemony depended on having complete control of Russia's vital energy reserves in Central Asia. As long as Russia remained strong, it remained a threat-a potential block to the complete imposition of Bilderberg-led economic and military will.

Bilderberg energy imperatives and geopolitical control are once again coming to play a key role in the lives of hundreds of millions of unsuspecting people.

Brzezinski spelled out in The Grand Chessboard the compelling energy issue driving American policy: "A power that dominates Eurasia would control two of the world's three most advanced and economically productive regions. A mere glance at the map also suggests that control over Eurasia would almost automatically entail Africa's subordination, rendering the Western Hemisphere and Oceania geopolitically peripheral to the world's central continent. About 75 percent of the world's people live in Eurasia, and most of the world's physical wealth is there as well, both in its enterprise and underneath its soil. Eurasia accounts for 60 percent of the world's GNP and about three-fourths of the world's known energy resources."

The history of mankind has always shown that controlling the heart of Eurasia was the key to controlling the entire known world. Azerbaijan, containing the riches of the Caspian Sea Basin and Central Asia, is a case in point. From the US perspective, the independence of the Central Asian states will be rendered nearly meaningless if Azerbaijan becomes fully subordinated to Moscow's control. To the Bilderbergers, energy imperatives are the end game.

The energy theme appears again later in Brzezinski's book, written four years before 9/11: "The world's energy consumption is bound to vastly increase over the next two or three decades. Estimates by the US Department of Energy anticipate that world demand will rise by more than 50 percent between 1993 and 2015, with the most significant increase in consumption occurring in the Far East. The momentum of Asia's economic development is already generating massive pressures for the exploration and exploitation of new sources of energy."

Clearly, to the Bilderbergers, Russia was the beginning of the end game.
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Jelena Milic

ne hvala. nisam pristalica teorije sukoba civilizacija. kao sto nisam bila ni pristalica histerije fukojamine o kraju istorije.

Jelena Milic

no, mislim da ne bi trebali da zaboravimo jednu bitnu temu koju ja pokusavam da guram u svemu ovome--srbiju u svemu ovome!

gordanac

Srbija?
Na dobrom putu da reši nasleđene probleme, da stvori jasnu listu
prioriteta za buduće decenije, da u procenjenim rokovima (koje sama
sebi daje) obavi poslove evroatlantskih integracija, da razume da se
može biti i objekt globalizacije, a da se ne mora biti gubitnik, sa
šansom da svakodnevno sebi postavlja pitanje koje ja predlažem Kaganu,
da to pitanje postavljaju sebi ljudi na javnim poslovima kao zadatak, a
javno mnjenje kao zahtev za rezultatom ili kritiku. To se pitanje može
postavljati dobrovoljno (sa znanjem) ili pod pritiskom. Ali će, bar u
Srbiji, biti postavljano.

Srbi nikad ozbiljna pitanja nece postavljati (osim retkih izuzetaka) ....

gde spadaju australija i nz u tvojoj podeli na sever i jug? takodje, zemlje jugoistocne azije tesko da su gubitnici i objekti globalizacije. ja cak na neki nacin i afriku vidim kao dobitnika u globalizaciji. da, see jagadish bhagwatija npr na tu temu.

terorizam je pre garbage of fundamentalizam....

"apsolutnu premoć neformalnih grupa za strateško, ekonomsko i političko odlučivanje i za rešavanje konflikata i potpun drugi plan u kojem su institucije " ...ovo mi je malo spooky. nekako mi lici na ladlama :))

sto se srbije tice, bojim se da mi ne mozemo sami birati ni uslove ni dinamiku pod kojim hocemo u evro-atlantske integracije.

...good case bi bio da postanemo i subjekat globalizacije!...

globalizacija jeste isprovocirala reakciju--klasicni fundamendalisticki strah od nepoznatog--ali to sto ti je nepoznato doslo na tv ekran, u komsiluk, pa ne moran epoznato nuzno da bude odgovrno ili krivo za tvoju radikalnu reakciju na to.

Vladimir B.

1)...Drugim recima, da li je Rusija pre svega neprijatelj zato sto je na Istoku, slavofona i cirilicna, zato sto jednim krakom ispada iz kulturnog kruga zapadnoevropskih zemalja, pre nego politicki?

To substantiate this, we quote the words of the Archbishop of Paris, Cardinal Sibor, which were pronounced at the start of the Crimean War, "It is a sacred deed, a God-pleasing deed, to ward off the Photian heresy [Orthodoxy], subjugate it and destroy it with a new crusade. This is the clear goal of today's crusade. Such was the goal of all the crusades, even if all their participants were not fully aware of it. The war which France is now preparing to wage against Russia is not a political war but a holy war. It is not a war between two governments or between two peoples, but is precisely a religious war, and other reasons presented are only pretexts."

Khomyakov wrote the article, by the way, to prove the total incompatibility between the Western, especially Protestant, confession and Eastern Orthodox Christianity. His arguments for this thesis seem quite strong in light of modern Russian history.

...like Valesians, they castrate their guests and promote them not only to the clergy but to the episcopacy;...

Vladimir B.

2) da li se nedovrsen/prekinut Milosevicev govor u Hagu...moze uzimati u obzir u nekoj ozbiljnijoj raspravi?

Vladimir B.

3) kako se uspostavljaju pojmovne granice izmedju centralizovane demokratije i centralizovane (prosvecene) autokratije?

Vladimir B.

4) ...Rusija se eventualno busa da stiti svetsku kulturu, ili prosvecenost, ali ne i slobodu. Zasto?

U poredjenju sa ostalim clanicama ruskog bloka

...Mi nismo igrac na globalnom nivou, cak više ne možemo nešto ozbiljnije na tom nivou, pa ni regionalno da zabrljamo, jer nam nece dozvoliti ...

Dovoljno je gledati kako radi narodna skupština, šta dominira- primitivizam, vređanje, posmevanje, hvalisanje, a kad kao hoče da budu ozbiljni onda nam otkrivaju nove zavere, krivica svih i svakoga, samo naše nema.