Svetska finansijska kriza, Afrika i ja

Svet
Finansijska kriza pogodila i najbogatije ljude sveta
Tajkuni izgubili milijarde za mesec dana
Autor: T. T. | 15.10.2008. - 05:00


Silvio Berluskoni, italijanski premijer, obećao je građanima svoje zemlje da im finansijska kriza neće odneti “ni jedan jedini evro” sa bankarskih računa. Ali on sam, koji je prema časopisu “Forbs” najbogatiji šef vlade u svetu, izgubio je zbog potresa na svetskim berzama već 1,7 milijardi evra, ili 2,3 milijarde dolara privatne imovine.

Berluskoni, koji je početkom godine imao 9,4 milijarde dolara, ostao je bez četvrtine bogatstva jer su akcije njegovih kompanija na berzi zabeležile pad od 38 odsto.
Rekorder među gubitašima je Lakšmi Mital, britanski milijarder indijskog porekla. On je u globalnoj kreditnoj krizi izgubio 34 milijarde dolara (20 milijardi funti). Kako su izračunali britanski mediji, najbogatiji Britanac je gubio 11,9 miliona dolara (sedam miliona funti) na sat u poslednja četiri meseca.
Ništa bolje nisu prošli ni ruski oligarsi, ranije visokoplasirani na listi “Forbsa” - od Olega Deripaske, ruskog kralja aluminijuma, do Romana Abramoviča, vlasnika Fudbalskog kluba Čelsi.
Najbogatiji Rusi, njih 25, izgubili su, zbirno gledano, od 19. maja do danas 230 milijardi dolara, ili 62 odsto bogatstva.
Deripaskina kompanija “Rusal” zabeležila je gubitak od 16 milijardi dolara, dok je Abramovič, vlasnik akcija u “Evraz grupi”, ostao kraći za 20 milijardi dolara.

Bafet zaradio na krizi
Investicioni magnat Voren Bafet, predsednik i većinski deoničar holdinga “Berkšir hatavej”, izbegao je sudbinu ostalih bogataša i mudro uspeo da uveća svoje bogatstvo za 33 dana, od 29. avgusta do 1. oktobra, za osam milijardi dolara, pa sada ima 68 milijardi. Potpuni proračun za sve milijardere sa spiska “Forbs

Ličnost Danas: Pol Robin Krugmen
Autor: Marija Kojčić

Pol Robin Krugmen, američki ekonomista, kolumnista i autor brojnih knjiga, dobitnik je ovogodišnje Nobelove nagrade za ekonomiju. U saopštenju Nobelovog komiteta navodi se da je Krugmen postavio novu teoriju u ekonomiji koja pruža odgovore na pitanje koji su efekti slobodne trgovine i globalizacije, kao i šta je pokretačka snaga urbanizacije u svetu. Američkom ekonomisti biće uručena nagrada u vrednosti od 1,4 miliona dolara.


Krugmen je rođen 28. februara 1953. Diplomirao je ekonomiju 1974. na Univerzitetu Jejl, a tri godine kasnije odbranio je doktorsku disertaciju na Tehnološkom institutu u Masačusetsu (MIT). Od 1982. do 1983. radi u administraciji Ronalda Regana kao član Veća ekonomskih savetnika. Predavao je na Univerzitetu Jejl, MIT, Berkliju, u Londonskoj ekonomskoj školi, kao i na Univerzitetu Stenford, a od 2000. je profesor međunarodnih odnosa na Univerzitetu Prinston. Američko ekonomsko udruženje mu je 1991. dodelilo medalju Džon Bejts Klark. Ubrajaju ga među 50 najuticajnijih naučnika na svetu.

Kada je 1993. Bil Klinton stupio na predsedničku funkciju, nova administracija nije ponudila Krugmenu posao. Kao razlog za to navedena je preterana otvorenost američkog naučnika.“Moj temperament me čini neprikladnim za tu ulogu. Da biste bili na funkciji, morate da posedujete izvesne veštine, pa tako da se ugrizete za jezik kada ljudi govore gluposti“, priznao je i sam Krugmen.

Ovaj američki ekonomista smatra se političkim liberalom koji je poznat i kao oštri kritičar administracije Džordža Buša i Republikanske stranke. Ne usteže se ni da uputi kritiku na račun republikanske predsedničke nade Džona Mekejna za koga je rekao da je „sada više uplašen nego što je bio pre nekoliko sedmica“.

Krugmen je, takođe, kolumnista najpoznatijeg američkog časopisa Njujork tajmsa, a njegove tekstove čita više miliona ljudi. Osim toga, saradnik je više stručnih ekonomskih magazina. Kada je rečo aktuelnoj finansijskoj krizi, zagovara spasilački plan britanskog premijera Gordona Brauna koji obezbeđuje vladi vlasničke udele u potpomognutim finansijskim institucijama.

Dobitnik ovogodišnje Nobelove nagrade za ekonomiju autor je preko 200 naučnih radova i 20 knjiga i udžbenika.

UČINAK NEUČINJENOG
Ako u oktobru 2009. beogradske ulice budu prepune očajnih štediša i otpuštenih bankarskih službenika, baš to što, od jula do oktobra 2008. godine, vlada nije uradila ništa biće možda i glavna stvar po kojoj će se ona pominjati
Sto dana vlade poklopilo se sa ubrzanim osvešćenjem domaćeg javnog mnjenja da smo na pragu ekonomske recesije. Vlada je dobila veoma dobre ocene za svoj dosadašnji rad. To je posledica činjenice da nije uhvaćena u većoj grešci, ali i činjenice da mediji ovu vladu nisu ni lovili u greškama (kao one pre nje). Svejedno, novinari nisu mogli a da, tokom različitih obeležavanja prvih sto dana, zabrinuto ne pitaju šta vlada namerava da preduzme povodom krize koja nam dolazi. Dobijali su veoma umirujuće i optimističke odgovore, koje su onda i sami optimistički i umirujuće prosleđivali publici.

Naravno da vlada treba da umiruje javnost. Ako stanovništvo zahvati panika, ekonomska kriza brzo se pretvara u katastrofu. Ipak, jedna stvar je umirivati građanstvo, a druga je preduzimati stvarne korake da se kriza umanji. Nevolja je u tome što je ova kriza takva da zahteva drugačije ideje od onih na koje je naša elita navikla. Ali, pošto tih ideja izgleda da nema, elita ne radi ništa drugo nego što ponavlja nekoliko uopštenih, umirujućih rečenica.

Međutim, već je uočeno da je ovaj ekonomski bankrot, koji se odigrava u SAD, istovremeno i bankrot nekih vladajućih ideja. Najozbiljnije je potkopana neoliberalna dogma da sve treba samo prepustiti bankarima i preduzetnicima, sniziti poreze i ukinuti carine, pa će celo društvo brzo stići u potrošački raj. Zahvaljujući toj dogmi špekulantski kapital osvojio je samo srce sistema. Sada država treba da izvrši operaciju na otvorenom srcu, kako sistem ne bi izdahnuo. U pomoć se pozivaju znanja iz 1929, a autori kao što su Kejns i Šumpeter odjednom postaju aktuelni. Ponovo se može čuti da država ipak mora da brine o tržištu i da nije sve u kapitalu, već da ima nešto i u radu.

Osim ove opšte pouke o pogrešnosti jedne dogme, Srbija bi trebalo da izvuče i dva posebna naravoučenija. Prvo se tiče recepata koji nam neprestano stižu upravo sa mesta gde je danas središte krize. Oni koji su drugome, arogantno i u detalje, propisivali šta i kako mora da radi pokazali su se kao neznalice i nesolidni ljudi u svojoj sopstvenoj stvari. Čitava jedna sekcija ovdašnjeg neoliberalnog i evroreformskog lobija nije radila ništa drugo do što nam je u beskraj ponavljala sledeću rečenicu: „Sve je već odavno smišljeno, sve je već odavno poznato, nema mi šta da mislimo, nema šta da se pitamo, samo treba disciplinovano da sledimo uputstva koja nam daju razvijeniji i pametniji”. E pa sada ti pametniji u jednom danu moraju da potroše 700 milijardi dolara – što je 70 godišnjih budžeta cele države Srbije – samo da bi, dok nešto bolje ne smisle, zaustavili finansijski kolaps.

Druga pouka tiče se EU. Odgovor Brisela na krizu još nije usklađen, pa evro sada pada brže nego dolar (iza koga je ipak stala centralizovana država). Dok se ne postigne dogovor, pojedine evropske zemlje počele su da se spasavaju kako znaju i umeju. Verovatno da će na kraju biti ugovorena zajednička politika EU u odnosu na ekonomsku krizu. Ipak, sve prognoze vele da EU u 2009. pre očekuje recesija, nego sadašnja stopa rasta. To ne znači da će se EU u 2009. raspasti. To samo znači da će u EU porasti opšta nervoza i da će se smanjiti ionako već posustali entuzijazam za dalje proširenje.

Već nekoliko puta sam pisao o tome da je loše ako je EU za nas jedina alternativa, odnosno da svaka zrela elita mora da ima i plan „Be”. Pogotovo je to nužno u zemlji čiji su odnosi sa EU dodatno opterećeni time što su otcepljenje Kosova podržale pojedine zemlje EU. U okolnostima kada su svi zaokupljeni vlastitim spasavanjem i kada brzo nestaje želje za širenjem, čitav EU projekat u Srbiji lako može doći u pitanje. Ne videti to i ne misliti o rezervnim izlazima može samo onaj ko nije u stanju da razlikuje želje i stvarnost.

Takođe, naivno je pretpostaviti da će i za samu Srbiju 2009. biti laka. Kao što je upozorio Branko Pavlović, Srbija godišnje troši devet milijardi dolara više nego što zaradi. Jednu trećinu toga dobijamo od privatizacije, trećinu dobijamo od inostranih kredita, a trećinu nam šalju gastarbajteri. Finansijska kriza u SAD i EU znači smanjenje investicija, što znači da ćemo teže prodavati našu imovinu (ako iko bude hteo je da kupi). Finansijska kriza takođe znači i skuplje kredite, odnosno njihovo teže dobijanje. Konačno, kriza će pogoditi i našu dijasporu, koja će manje novca moći da šalje u Srbiju. „Socijalno odgovorna” vlada, koja je i sa ovakvim stanjem ekonomije jedva obezbedila novac za zadovoljenje svih ambicija, imaće na raspolaganju mnogo manje finansijskih sredstava za ublažavanje krize. Ne želim da zloslutim. Ali „loš život” u 2008. godini možda će nam, već za godinu dana, izgledati kao vreme sasvim pristojnog blagostanja.

U tom svetlu treba procenjivati i učinke ove vlade. Trenutno možemo reći da ona od jula do oktobra 2008. godine nije uradila ništa veliko, niti dobro, ni zlo. Ali, ako u oktobru 2009. beogradske ulice budu prepune očajnih štediša i otpuštenih bankarskih službenika, baš to što, od jula do oktobra 2008. godine, ona nije uradila ništa, biće možda i glavna stvar po kojoj će se pominjati ova vlada.

politički analitičar

Red Alert: The G-7 -- Geopolitics, Politics and the Financial Crisis

The finance ministers of the G-7 countries are meeting in Washington. The first announcements on the meetings will come this weekend. It is not too extreme to say that the outcome of these meetings could redefine how the financial markets work, certainly for months and perhaps for a generation. The Americans are arguing that the regime of intervention and bailouts be allowed to continue. Others, like the British, are arguing for what in effect would be the nationalization of financial markets on a global scale. It is not clear what will be decided, but it is clear that this meeting matters.

The meetings will extend through the weekend to include members of the G-20 countries, which together account for about 90 percent of the global economy. This meeting was called because previous steps have not freed up lending between financial institutions, and the financial problem has increasingly become an economic one, affecting production and consumption in the global economy. The political leadership of these countries is under extreme pressure from the public to do something to solve — or at least alleviate — the problem.

Underlying this political pressure is a sense that the financial class, people who run global financial institutions, have failed to behave responsibly and effectively, and have therefore lost their legitimacy. The expectation, reasonable or not, is that the political system will now supplant these managers and impose at least a temporary solution. The finance ministers therefore have a political mandate, almost global in scope, to act decisively. The question is what they will do?

That question then divides further into two parts. The first is whether they will try to craft a single, global, integrated solution. The second is the degree to which they will take control of the financial system — and inter-financial institution lending in particular. (A primary reason for the credit crunch is that banks are currently afraid to lend — even to each other.) Thus far, attempts at solutions on the whole have been national rather than international. In addition, they have been built around incentivizing certain action and increasing the available money in the system.

So far, this hasn’t worked. The first problem is that financial institutions have not increased interbank lending significantly because they are concerned about the unknowns in the borrower’s balance sheet, and about the borrowers’ ability to repay the loans. With even large institutions failing, the fear is that other institutions will fail, but since the identity of the ones that will fail is unknown, lending on any terms — with or without government money — is imprudent. There is more lending to non-financial corporations than to financial ones because fewer unknowns are involved. Therefore, in the United States, infusions and promises of infusion of funds have not solved the basic problem: the uncertain solvency of the borrower.

The second problem is the international character of the crisis. An example from the Icelandic meltdown is relevant. The government of Iceland promised to repay Icelandic depositors in the island country’s failed banks. They did not extend the guarantee to non-Icelandic depositors. Partly they simply didn’t have the cash, but partly the view has been that taking care of one’s own takes priority. Countries do not want to bail out foreigners, and different governments do not want to assume the liabilities of other nations. The nature of political solutions is always that politicians respond to their own constituencies, not to people who can’t vote for them.

This weekend some basic decisions have to be made. The first is whether to give the bailouts time to work, to increase the packages or to accept that they have failed and move to the next step. The next step is for governments and central banks to take over decision making from financial institutions, and cause them to lend. This can be done in one of two ways. The first is to guarantee the loans made between financial institutions so that solvency is not an issue and risk is eliminated. The second is to directly take over the lending process, with the state dictating how much is lent to whom. In a real sense, the distinction between the two is not as significant as it appears. The market is abolished and wealth is distributed through mechanisms created by the state, with risk eliminated from the system, or more precisely, transferred from the lender to the taxing authority of the state.

The more complex issue is how to manage this on an international scale. For example, American banks lend to European banks. If the United States comes up with a plan which guarantees loans to U.S. banks but not European banks, and Europeans lend to Europe and not the United States, the integration of the global economy will very quickly shatter, leading to significant limitations on international trade, currency convertibility and so on. You will nationalize economies that can’t stand being purely national.

At the same time, there is no global mechanism for managing radical solutions. In taking over lending or guarantees, the administrative structure is everything. Managing the interbank-lending of the global economy is something for which there is no institution. And even with coordination, finance ministries and central banks would find it difficult to bear the burden — not to mention managing the system’s Herculean size and labyrinthine complexity. But if the G-7 in effect nationalize global financial systems and do it without international understandings and coordination, the consequences will be immediate and serious.

The G-7 is looking hard for a solution that will not require this level of intrusion, both because they don’t want to abolish markets even temporarily, and more important, because they have no idea how to manage this on a global scale. They very much want to have the problem solved with liquidity injections and bailouts. Their inclination is to give the current regime some more time. The problem is that the global equity markets are destroying value at extremely high rates and declines are approaching historic levels.

In other words, a crisis in the financial system is becoming an economic problem — and that means public pressure will surge, not decline. Therefore, it is plausible that they might choose to ask for what FDR did in 1933, a bank holiday, which in this case would be the suspension of trading on equity markets globally for several days while administrative solutions are reached. We have no information whatsoever that they are thinking of this, but in starting to grapple with a problem of this magnitude — and searching for solutions on this scale — it is totally understandable that they might like to buy some time.

It is not clear what they will decide. Fundamental issues to watch for are whether they move from manipulating markets through government intrusions that leave the markets fundamentally free, or do they abandon free markets at least temporarily.

Another such issue is whether they can find a way to do this globally or whether it will be done nationally. If they do go international and suspending markets, the question is how they will unwind this situation. It will be easier to start this than to end it and state-controlled markets are usually not very attractive in the long run. But then again, neither is where we are now.

This report may be forwarded or republished on your Web site with attribution to www.stratfor.com

For media interviews contact pr@stratfor.com or call 512-744-4309

Tell Stratfor What You Think
Red Alert: The G-7 -- Geopolitics, Politics and the Financial Crisis

The finance ministers of the G-7 countries are meeting in Washington. The first announcements on the meetings will come this weekend. It is not too extreme to say that the outcome of these meetings could redefine how the financial markets work, certainly for months and perhaps for a generation. The Americans are arguing that the regime of intervention and bailouts be allowed to continue. Others, like the British, are arguing for what in effect would be the nationalization of financial markets on a global scale. It is not clear what will be decided, but it is clear that this meeting matters.

The meetings will extend through the weekend to include members of the G-20 countries, which together account for about 90 percent of the global economy. This meeting was called because previous steps have not freed up lending between financial institutions, and the financial problem has increasingly become an economic one, affecting production and consumption in the global economy. The political leadership of these countries is under extreme pressure from the public to do something to solve — or at least alleviate — the problem.

Underlying this political pressure is a sense that the financial class, people who run global financial institutions, have failed to behave responsibly and effectively, and have therefore lost their legitimacy. The expectation, reasonable or not, is that the political system will now supplant these managers and impose at least a temporary solution. The finance ministers therefore have a political mandate, almost global in scope, to act decisively. The question is what they will do?

That question then divides further into two parts. The first is whether they will try to craft a single, global, integrated solution. The second is the degree to which they will take control of the financial system — and inter-financial institution lending in particular. (A primary reason for the credit crunch is that banks are currently afraid to lend — even to each other.) Thus far, attempts at solutions on the whole have been national rather than international. In addition, they have been built around incentivizing certain action and increasing the available money in the system.

So far, this hasn’t worked. The first problem is that financial institutions have not increased interbank lending significantly because they are concerned about the unknowns in the borrower’s balance sheet, and about the borrowers’ ability to repay the loans. With even large institutions failing, the fear is that other institutions will fail, but since the identity of the ones that will fail is unknown, lending on any terms — with or without government money — is imprudent. There is more lending to non-financial corporations than to financial ones because fewer unknowns are involved. Therefore, in the United States, infusions and promises of infusion of funds have not solved the basic problem: the uncertain solvency of the borrower.

The second problem is the international character of the crisis. An example from the Icelandic meltdown is relevant. The government of Iceland promised to repay Icelandic depositors in the island country’s failed banks. They did not extend the guarantee to non-Icelandic depositors. Partly they simply didn’t have the cash, but partly the view has been that taking care of one’s own takes priority. Countries do not want to bail out foreigners, and different governments do not want to assume the liabilities of other nations. The nature of political solutions is always that politicians respond to their own constituencies, not to people who can’t vote for them.

This weekend some basic decisions have to be made. The first is whether to give the bailouts time to work, to increase the packages or to accept that they have failed and move to the next step. The next step is for governments and central banks to take over decision making from financial institutions, and cause them to lend. This can be done in one of two ways. The first is to guarantee the loans made between financial institutions so that solvency is not an issue and risk is eliminated. The second is to directly take over the lending process, with the state dictating how much is lent to whom. In a real sense, the distinction between the two is not as significant as it appears. The market is abolished and wealth is distributed through mechanisms created by the state, with risk eliminated from the system, or more precisely, transferred from the lender to the taxing authority of the state.

The more complex issue is how to manage this on an international scale. For example, American banks lend to European banks. If the United States comes up with a plan which guarantees loans to U.S. banks but not European banks, and Europeans lend to Europe and not the United States, the integration of the global economy will very quickly shatter, leading to significant limitations on international trade, currency convertibility and so on. You will nationalize economies that can’t stand being purely national.

At the same time, there is no global mechanism for managing radical solutions. In taking over lending or guarantees, the administrative structure is everything. Managing the interbank-lending of the global economy is something for which there is no institution. And even with coordination, finance ministries and central banks would find it difficult to bear the burden — not to mention managing the system’s Herculean size and labyrinthine complexity. But if the G-7 in effect nationalize global financial systems and do it without international understandings and coordination, the consequences will be immediate and serious.

The G-7 is looking hard for a solution that will not require this level of intrusion, both because they don’t want to abolish markets even temporarily, and more important, because they have no idea how to manage this on a global scale. They very much want to have the problem solved with liquidity injections and bailouts. Their inclination is to give the current regime some more time. The problem is that the global equity markets are destroying value at extremely high rates and declines are approaching historic levels.

In other words, a crisis in the financial system is becoming an economic problem — and that means public pressure will surge, not decline. Therefore, it is plausible that they might choose to ask for what FDR did in 1933, a bank holiday, which in this case would be the suspension of trading on equity markets globally for several days while administrative solutions are reached. We have no information whatsoever that they are thinking of this, but in starting to grapple with a problem of this magnitude — and searching for solutions on this scale — it is totally understandable that they might like to buy some time.

It is not clear what they will decide. Fundamental issues to watch for are whether they move from manipulating markets through government intrusions that leave the markets fundamentally free, or do they abandon free markets at least temporarily.

Another such issue is whether they can find a way to do this globally or whether it will be done nationally. If they do go international and suspending markets, the question is how they will unwind this situation. It will be easier to start this than to end it and state-controlled markets are usually not very attractive in the long run. But then again, neither is where we are now.

This report may be forwarded or republished on your Web site with attribution to www.stratfor.com

For media interviews contact pr@stratfor.com or call 512-744-4309

Tell Stratfor What You Think

Европљани договорили састанак са Бушом
ЕУ спремна на суштинску реформу светског финансијског система
Од нашег сталног дописника

Брисел, 16. октобра – Европска унија је спремна за суштинску реформу финансијског система. После неколико недеља лутања у тражењу општеприхваћених решења, лидери ЕУ најавили су данас у Бриселу да ће се у суботу у САД састати са америчким председником Џорџом Бушом како би се припремили за глобални самит на којем ће преиспитати светски финансијски систем. „Уколико можемо донети координисане одговоре на финансијску кризу, зашто не можемо донети координисане одговоре на економску кризу?”, реторички је упитао француски председник и председавајући ЕУ Никола Саркози на конференцији за новинаре. Он је истакао нужност одржавања светског самита на којем би били утврђени нови темељи капитализма, јер се мора избећи понављање кризе каква управо погађа свет. Саркози је објаснио да је потребно преуредити институције међу којима и Међународни монетарни фонд, али и најавио борбу против „пореских рајева” и појачану контролу светског тржишта новцем.

„Европа жели овај самит, захтева га и добиће га. Не смемо да пропустимо шансу да створимо организацију 21. века” – био је изричит Саркози, који је прецизирао да жели да светски самит буде одржан у новембру у Њујорку, управо тамо „где је све почело”.

Председавајући ЕУ је нагласио да на самиту морају бити донете стварне одлуке, а не само принципи, а у закључцима самита поред осталог је наглашена потреба надзора европског финансијског сектора и развијање усаглашеног система надзора на европском нивоу.

Савет ЕУ подржао је акциони план мера за помоћ финансијским институцијама са 2.000 милијарди евра, који је предложен прошлог викенда у Паризу на ванредном самиту држава еврозоне и Велике Британије.

Сходно закључцима самита у којима се изражава одлучност ЕУ да предузме координисане акције, председник Европске комисије Жозе Мануел Барозо позвао је све чланице ЕУ да ускладе своје националне мере са акционим планом.

Координисани рад требало би да обезбеди функционалност финансијског система и нормално и ефективно финансирање економије и повратак економског раста и запошљавања.

Британски премијер Гордон Браун казао је да су се лидери ЕУ усагласили да је потребна реформа међународног финансијског система, али су потребне и мере за опоравак поклекле индустрије у ЕУ.

У делу закључака самита који су посвећени даљој судбини Лисабонског споразума, чија је ратификација одбијена на јунском референдуму у Републици Ирској, јасно се наводи да је читава ствар заправо одгођена за децембарски самит ЕУ. Ирски премијер Брајан Коуен до тада би требало да смисли предлог за превазилажење кризе, односно, како се незванично очекује, да предложи датум понављања референдума, а како званично стоји у закључцима „да настави консултације у погледу доприноса у тражењу решења за ситуацију”. Према недавним анкетама ирских колега, расположење грађана у тој земљи према одбијању „Лисабона” у међувремену је порасло.

Лидери ЕУ потврдили су такође намеру да у децембру усвоје договор о енергетским и климатским променама и најавили да ће по овим питањима блиско сарађивати са Европским парламентом, по предлозима Европске комисије. Они су оценили да је неопходно јачање енергетске инфраструктуре, осигурање стабилности енергетских извора и транзитних путева.

В. Јокановић