War (and peace), Inc.

Rusko pitanje
Srbija u ruskoj sferi uticaja
Rusija ima „privilegovane interese” u državama sa kojima se graniči, ali i u onima sa kojima je povezana prijateljskim i posebnim istorijskim odnosima, rekao je ruski predsednik Dmitrij Medvedev

Dmitrij Medvedev Foto AP Srbija je jedna od zemalja u kojima Rusija ima „privilegovani interes”, može se zaključiti iz objašnjenja ruskog predsednika Dmitrija Medvedeva o osnovama spoljne politike Moskve koja je, kako je rekao u intervjuu za najveće ruske televizije, bazirana na pet principa.

Prva četiri su poštovanje osnovnih principa međunarodnog prava, multipolarnost svetskog poretka, stav da Rusija ne želi ni konfrontaciju sa drugim zemljama, ni izolaciju, i bezuslovna zaštita života i dostojanstva ruskih građana „gde god se oni nalaze”. Peti princip, po Medvedevu, glasi da i „Rusija, kao druge zemlje sveta, ima oblasti u kojima ima privilegovane interese”.

„U tim oblastima postoje države s kojima nas tradicionalno povezuju prijateljski srdačni odnosi, istorijski posebni odnosi. U tim oblastima mi ćemo raditi vrlo pažljivo i s tim državama, našim bliskim susedima, razvijati prijateljske odnose”, izjavio je ruski predsednik, a zatim na pitanje novinara da pojasni da li su „prioritetne oblasti” zapravo teritorije koje se graniče s Rusijom rekao: „Da, naravno, one koje se graniče s Rusijom, ali ne samo one”.

Srbija se svakako kandiduje za zemlju iz opisa Medvedeva – bar po stavkama „tradicionalno prijateljstvo” i „istorijski odnosi” – ali je zanimljiva još jedna rečenica koju je on izgovorio i koja bi takođe mogla da se odnosi na politiku Moskve prema Beogradu.

„Mi ćemo takođe štititi interese naše poslovne zajednice van granica zemlje”, rekao je elaborirajući četvrti princip spoljne politike (zaštita ruskih državljana) i zapretio da će na svaki „agresivni napad biti odgovoreno”.

Reči predsednika zvuče veoma različito od onih koje su pre pet godina izgovarali drugi visoki zvaničnici Rusije u vreme kad je rešeno da se ruski vojnici povuku iz sastava Kfora (Rusi su, podsetimo, bili prvi strani vojnici koji su ušli na teritoriju naše južne pokrajineu junu 1999, a povukli su se u julu 2003).

Maja 2003. ministar odbrane Sergej Ivanov rekao je da je odluka o povlačenju ruskog kontingenta doneta jer se „situacija na terenu popravila” i da će, uostalom, „ta operacija uskoro preći u policijsku fazu”. Nešto pre toga, general Anatolij Kvašnjin, načelnik generalštaba ruske vojske, rekao je da je održavanje vojske na Balkanu skupo za Rusiju – iznosilo je nešto manje od trideset miliona dolara godišnje.

Ohrabrena uspehom u Gruziji, Moskva sada šalje poruku da se više neće povlačiti i da će oštro braniti svoje interese tamo gde ih pronađe (definicija predsednika Medvedeva o „privilegovanim” interesima i oblastima mogla bi da se odnosi i na Kubu, na primer), ali nije jasno da li će moći da izdrži trku za prevlast na prostoru Evroazije i da istovremeno spreči jačanje separatističkih težnji u sopstvenoj državi.

U Srbiji je za ovakvu politiku za sada dobila podršku opozicije, čiji predstavnici u izjavama za „Politiku” tvrde da je dobro biti u ruskoj sferi uticaja.

Tako Dragan Todorović, iz Srpske radikalne stranke, kaže da prvi korak ka tome treba da bude usvajanje naftno-gasnog sporazuma i da Rusija ne samo da treba da uzme Srbiju u sferu svojih interesa, već takvu praksu nikada nije ni trebalo da prekida.

„Najbolji dokaz za to jeste ono kroz šta smo prošli devedesetih godina kada je Rusija bila na silaznoj putanji. Kada je Srbiji bilo izuzetno teško u vezi sa Kosovom i Metohijom, Rusija je svojim principijelnim stavom doprinela da nezavisnost prizna manji broj država, iako je najavljivano da će to učiniti više od sto zemalja”, objašnjava Todorović.

On ne očekuje da će Rusija promeniti politiku prema Kosovu.

Potpredsednik Demokratske stranke Srbije Slobodan Samardžić smatra da je „normalno” da Srbija bude u sferi ruskog uticaja kao što već predstavlja polje interesa Evropske unije i Sjedinjenih Američkih Država. On ističe da Srbija mora biti otvorena za sve te tri konglomeracije velikih ekonomskih i političkih sila.

„Ne vidim zašto bi se Srbija opirala uticaju Rusije ako se ne opire uticaju EU ili SAD. Što se Rusije tiče, politički uticaji su posebno interesantni, a sve više i ekonomski. Svaka ekonomska sila zainteresovana da ulaže u Srbiju je dobrodošla. Rusija nema nikakve političke zahteve za to kao što EU ili SAD traže da se Srbija odrekne dela teritorije da bi je zadržali kao predmet ekonomskog ulaganja. U tome je trenutno prednost Rusije”, navodi Samardžić. Prema njegovom mišljenju, Srbija najpre treba da potpiše gasni sporazum sa Rusijom, a zatim da se oslobodi predrasuda da sa Istokom ne treba trgovati i sarađivati kao što se sarađuje sa Zapadom.

Dušan Lazić, član Foruma za međunarodne odnose, kaže daje naša država, kad je reč o Srbiji kao mogućoj sferi ruskog uticaja, zbog problema Kosova najranjivija zemlja u regionu.
Srbija, po Laziću, može da bude posebno zanimljiva samo u slučaju da Balkan dobije posebno mesto u ruskoj spoljnopolitičkoj strategiji. Beograd zato treba da pažljivo prati poteze Moskve i da prema njima reaguje u skaldu sa procenama sopstvenih interesa.


A. Marinković - V. Radomirović

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O nezavisnosti Kosova i kavkaskih oblasti

„Svaka država individualno odlučuje o priznavanju i tu ne može biti nikakvih kolektivnih postupaka. Uzmite za primer Kosovo. Savršeno je jasno da i u toj situaciji ima država koje se slažu sa stvaranjem novih država i da ima onih koje misle da nije vreme za to. Ali naglašavam da se međunarodno pravo zasniva na tome da nova država, ili kako pravnici kažu, da se nova država kao subjekt prava stvara u trenutku priznanja od strane neke druge države. Zbog toga su, sa pravne tačke gledišta, ove nove države nastale. Proces priznavanja može se produžiti na dugi rok, ali se naša pozicija zbog toga neće menjati. Mi smo svoju odluku doneli. Doneli smo je bespovratno. Naš dug je da se obezbedi mir i spokojstvo u tom regionu i mi ćemo raditi na osnovu toga”, rekao je Medvedev.

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„Mrtva straža“

- Čini mi se da je izjava predsednika Medvedeva relativizovana sadržajem ostala četiri principa. Naime, ukoliko bi se držala međunarodnog prava, težila stvaranju političke ravnoteže u svetu, održavala prijateljske odnose sa drugim narodima i štitila ruske građane Rusija bi bila prinuđena ili da prilično suzi željenu sferu uticaja ili da redefiniše sam taj pojam – kaže za „Politiku“ istoričar Čedomir Antić i dodaje:

- Čini mi se da se nalazimo u sličnoj poziciji kao u prošlosti: podrška Rusije i eventualno pristupanje njenoj sferi učinilo bi Srbiju izolovanom na Balkanu i u Istočnoj Evropi. U prošlosti (posebno 1780, 1853. ili 1878) Rusija je kao svoju znu videla istočni Balkan, Srbiju je prepuštala Austriji. Godine 1914, (a donekle je tako bilo i 1941) Srbija (Jugoslavija) bile su privržene Rusiji, ali su je od Rusije odvajali saveznici neprijateljskih sila .

- Mislim da Ruska federacija Srbiju danas pre svega vidi kao neku vrstu svoje geopolitičke „mrtve straže“, možda buduću svoju privrženicu u EU.


Privilegovani interesi

Nije jasno šta Medvedev hoće da kaže napomenom da sfera „privilegovanih interesa“ moskve nije samo u „prigraničnim regionima“, kaže Ivo Visković, profesor Fakulteta političkih nauka, bivši ambasador u Ljubljani.
- Što se tiče Balkana, izraz privilegovani interesi bi, po mom mišljenju, mogao da se odnosi samo na Srbiju i Crnu Goru...

ŽENEVA, 01.09.2008

Tanjug

HRV: Gruzija priznala da je koristila kasetne bombe
Gruzijske vlasti priznale su da su koristile kasetne bombe u napadima na Južnu Osetiju u kojima je poginulo najmanje 14 civila, saopštila je danas organizacija za zaštitu ljudskih prava "Hjuman rajts voč" (HRV)

Ministarstvo za odbranu Gruzije je navelo u zvaničnom pismu poslatom organizaciji "HRV" da su bombe M-85 korišćene u blizini tunela Roki koji povezuje Južnu Osetiju sa Rusijom, javio je Rojters.
"HRV" je potvrdio da je u avgustu najmanje 14 civila ubijeno, a više stotina ranjeno u najmanje četiri južnoosetijskih sela od kasetnih bombi koje su koristile gruzijske i ruske snage.
Ova ogranizacija sa sedištem u Njujorku je istovremenop objavila da su vlasti Rusije demantovale tvrdnju HRV da su i one koristile bombe M-85
HRV, međutim, tvrdi da poseduje dokaze koji potvrđuju njene navode.
Više od 100 zemalja se složilo u maju u irskom glavnom gradu Dablinu da upotreba kasetnih bombi treba da bude zabranjena zato što "ne prave razliku između boraca i neboraca civila, čime se krši međunarodni humanitarni zakon", ukazala je Boni Dočerti, istraživač iz "HRV".
Sastanak zemalja koje imaju nameru da potpišu taj sporazum održaće se u decembru u Oslu.
Dok su Rusija, Sjedinjene Američke Države i Narodna Republika Kina odbile da učestvuju na sastanku, Velika Britanija, Francuska i Nemačka su najavile svoje prisustvo.
Dočerti je iznela da je u napadu ruskih snaga 12. avgusta na gruzijsko selo Ruisi, južno od granice Južne Osetije, ubijeno najmanje tri civila, a ranjeno pet.
Istog dana, poginulo je osam civila a više desetina je ranjeno, takođe u ruskom vazdušnom napadu na grad Gori, dodala je Dočerti pozivajući se na izveštaje sa terena istraživača "HRV".
Dočerti je rekla i da je na stotine kasetnih bombi M-85 bačeno na gruzijski grad Šindisi, ali nije mogla da tačno kaže koje snage su ih bacile.
Naime bombe su izraelske proizvodnje i Rusija ne poseduje takve, istakla je Dočerti, ali je podsetila da se zna da je Izrael snabdevao Gruziju oružjem.
HRV je uputio poziv Gruziji i Rusiji da u potpunosti sarađuju sa evropskim ekipama za deminiranje koje su već stigle u region da bi počistile neeksplodirane bombice iz kasetnih bombi.
Svaka kasetna bomba sadrži veliki broj malih bombica od kojih sve ne moraju da eksplodiraju pri udaru u zemlju.
One mogu da budu aktivirane godinama kasnije, pa su velika opasnost za civile, naročito za decu.

The Medvedev Doctrine and American Strategy
September 2, 2008



By George Friedman

The United States has been fighting a war in the Islamic world since 2001. Its main theaters of operation are in Afghanistan and Iraq, but its politico-military focus spreads throughout the Islamic world, from Mindanao to Morocco. The situation on Aug. 7, 2008, was as follows:

The war in Iraq was moving toward an acceptable but not optimal solution. The government in Baghdad was not pro-American, but neither was it an Iranian puppet, and that was the best that could be hoped for. The United States anticipated pulling out troops, but not in a disorderly fashion.
The war in Afghanistan was deteriorating for the United States and NATO forces. The Taliban was increasingly effective, and large areas of the country were falling to its control. Force in Afghanistan was insufficient, and any troops withdrawn from Iraq would have to be deployed to Afghanistan to stabilize the situation. Political conditions in neighboring Pakistan were deteriorating, and that deterioration inevitably affected Afghanistan.
The United States had been locked in a confrontation with Iran over its nuclear program, demanding that Tehran halt enrichment of uranium or face U.S. action. The United States had assembled a group of six countries (the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council plus Germany) that agreed with the U.S. goal, was engaged in negotiations with Iran, and had agreed at some point to impose sanctions on Iran if Tehran failed to comply. The United States was also leaking stories about impending air attacks on Iran by Israel or the United States if Tehran didn’t abandon its enrichment program. The United States had the implicit agreement of the group of six not to sell arms to Tehran, creating a real sense of isolation in Iran.
Related Special Topic Page
The Russian Resurgence
In short, the United States remained heavily committed to a region stretching from Iraq to Pakistan, with main force committed to Iraq and Afghanistan, and the possibility of commitments to Pakistan (and above all to Iran) on the table. U.S. ground forces were stretched to the limit, and U.S. airpower, naval and land-based forces had to stand by for the possibility of an air campaign in Iran — regardless of whether the U.S. planned an attack, since the credibility of a bluff depended on the availability of force.

The situation in this region actually was improving, but the United States had to remain committed there. It was therefore no accident that the Russians invaded Georgia on Aug. 8 following a Georgian attack on South Ossetia. Forgetting the details of who did what to whom, the United States had created a massive window of opportunity for the Russians: For the foreseeable future, the United States had no significant forces to spare to deploy elsewhere in the world, nor the ability to sustain them in extended combat. Moreover, the United States was relying on Russian cooperation both against Iran and potentially in Afghanistan, where Moscow’s influence with some factions remains substantial. The United States needed the Russians and couldn’t block the Russians. Therefore, the Russians inevitably chose this moment to strike.

On Sunday, Russian Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev in effect ran up the Jolly Roger. Whatever the United States thought it was dealing with in Russia, Medvedev made the Russian position very clear. He stated Russian foreign policy in five succinct points, which we can think of as the Medvedev Doctrine (and which we see fit to quote here):

First, Russia recognizes the primacy of the fundamental principles of international law, which define the relations between civilized peoples. We will build our relations with other countries within the framework of these principles and this concept of international law.
Second, the world should be multipolar. A single-pole world is unacceptable. Domination is something we cannot allow. We cannot accept a world order in which one country makes all the decisions, even as serious and influential a country as the United States of America. Such a world is unstable and threatened by conflict.
Third, Russia does not want confrontation with any other country. Russia has no intention of isolating itself. We will develop friendly relations with Europe, the United States, and other countries, as much as is possible.
Fourth, protecting the lives and dignity of our citizens, wherever they may be, is an unquestionable priority for our country. Our foreign policy decisions will be based on this need. We will also protect the interests of our business community abroad. It should be clear to all that we will respond to any aggressive acts committed against us.
Finally, fifth, as is the case of other countries, there are regions in which Russia has privileged interests. These regions are home to countries with which we share special historical relations and are bound together as friends and good neighbors. We will pay particular attention to our work in these regions and build friendly ties with these countries, our close neighbors.
Medvedev concluded, “These are the principles I will follow in carrying out our foreign policy. As for the future, it depends not only on us but also on our friends and partners in the international community. They have a choice.”

The second point in this doctrine states that Russia does not accept the primacy of the United States in the international system. According to the third point, while Russia wants good relations with the United States and Europe, this depends on their behavior toward Russia and not just on Russia’s behavior. The fourth point states that Russia will protect the interests of Russians wherever they are — even if they live in the Baltic states or in Georgia, for example. This provides a doctrinal basis for intervention in such countries if Russia finds it necessary.

The fifth point is the critical one: “As is the case of other countries, there are regions in which Russia has privileged interests.” In other words, the Russians have special interests in the former Soviet Union and in friendly relations with these states. Intrusions by others into these regions that undermine pro-Russian regimes will be regarded as a threat to Russia’s “special interests.”

Thus, the Georgian conflict was not an isolated event — rather, Medvedev is saying that Russia is engaged in a general redefinition of the regional and global system. Locally, it would not be correct to say that Russia is trying to resurrect the Soviet Union or the Russian empire. It would be correct to say that Russia is creating a new structure of relations in the geography of its predecessors, with a new institutional structure with Moscow at its center. Globally, the Russians want to use this new regional power — and substantial Russian nuclear assets — to be part of a global system in which the United States loses its primacy.

These are ambitious goals, to say the least. But the Russians believe that the United States is off balance in the Islamic world and that there is an opportunity here, if they move quickly, to create a new reality before the United States is ready to respond. Europe has neither the military weight nor the will to actively resist Russia. Moreover, the Europeans are heavily dependent on Russian natural gas supplies over the coming years, and Russia can survive without selling it to them far better than the Europeans can survive without buying it. The Europeans are not a substantial factor in the equation, nor are they likely to become substantial.

This leaves the United States in an extremely difficult strategic position. The United States opposed the Soviet Union after 1945 not only for ideological reasons but also for geopolitical ones. If the Soviet Union had broken out of its encirclement and dominated all of Europe, the total economic power at its disposal, coupled with its population, would have allowed the Soviets to construct a navy that could challenge U.S. maritime hegemony and put the continental United States in jeopardy. It was U.S. policy during World Wars I and II and the Cold War to act militarily to prevent any power from dominating the Eurasian landmass. For the United States, this was the most important task throughout the 20th century.

The U.S.-jihadist war was waged in a strategic framework that assumed that the question of hegemony over Eurasia was closed. Germany’s defeat in World War II and the Soviet Union’s defeat in the Cold War meant that there was no claimant to Eurasia, and the United States was free to focus on what appeared to be the current priority — the defeat of radical Islamism. It appeared that the main threat to this strategy was the patience of the American public, not an attempt to resurrect a major Eurasian power.

The United States now faces a massive strategic dilemma, and it has limited military options against the Russians. It could choose a naval option, in which it would block the four Russian maritime outlets, the Sea of Japan and the Black, Baltic and Barents seas. The United States has ample military force with which to do this and could potentially do so without allied cooperation, which it would lack. It is extremely unlikely that the NATO council would unanimously support a blockade of Russia, which would be an act of war.

But while a blockade like this would certainly hurt the Russians, Russia is ultimately a land power. It is also capable of shipping and importing through third parties, meaning it could potentially acquire and ship key goods through European or Turkish ports (or Iranian ports, for that matter). The blockade option is thus more attractive on first glance than on deeper analysis.

More important, any overt U.S. action against Russia would result in counteractions. During the Cold War, the Soviets attacked American global interest not by sending Soviet troops, but by supporting regimes and factions with weapons and economic aid. Vietnam was the classic example: The Russians tied down 500,000 U.S. troops without placing major Russian forces at risk. Throughout the world, the Soviets implemented programs of subversion and aid to friendly regimes, forcing the United States either to accept pro-Soviet regimes, as with Cuba, or fight them at disproportionate cost.

In the present situation, the Russian response would strike at the heart of American strategy in the Islamic world. In the long run, the Russians have little interest in strengthening the Islamic world — but for the moment, they have substantial interest in maintaining American imbalance and sapping U.S. forces. The Russians have a long history of supporting Middle Eastern regimes with weapons shipments, and it is no accident that the first world leader they met with after invading Georgia was Syrian President Bashar al Assad. This was a clear signal that if the U.S. responded aggressively to Russia’s actions in Georgia, Moscow would ship a range of weapons to Syria — and far worse, to Iran. Indeed, Russia could conceivably send weapons to factions in Iraq that do not support the current regime, as well as to groups like Hezbollah. Moscow also could encourage the Iranians to withdraw their support for the Iraqi government and plunge Iraq back into conflict. Finally, Russia could ship weapons to the Taliban and work to further destabilize Pakistan.

At the moment, the United States faces the strategic problem that the Russians have options while the United States does not. Not only does the U.S. commitment of ground forces in the Islamic world leave the United States without strategic reserve, but the political arrangements under which these troops operate make them highly vulnerable to Russian manipulation — with few satisfactory U.S. counters.

The U.S. government is trying to think through how it can maintain its commitment in the Islamic world and resist the Russian reassertion of hegemony in the former Soviet Union. If the United States could very rapidly win its wars in the region, this would be possible. But the Russians are in a position to prolong these wars, and even without such agitation, the American ability to close off the conflicts is severely limited. The United States could massively increase the size of its army and make deployments into the Baltics, Ukraine and Central Asia to thwart Russian plans, but it would take years to build up these forces and the active cooperation of Europe to deploy them. Logistically, European support would be essential — but the Europeans in general, and the Germans in particular, have no appetite for this war. Expanding the U.S. Army is necessary, but it does not affect the current strategic reality.

This logistical issue might be manageable, but the real heart of this problem is not merely the deployment of U.S. forces in the Islamic world — it is the Russians’ ability to use weapons sales and covert means to deteriorate conditions dramatically. With active Russian hostility added to the current reality, the strategic situation in the Islamic world could rapidly spin out of control.

The United States is therefore trapped by its commitment to the Islamic world. It does not have sufficient forces to block Russian hegemony in the former Soviet Union, and if it tries to block the Russians with naval or air forces, it faces a dangerous riposte from the Russians in the Islamic world. If it does nothing, it creates a strategic threat that potentially towers over the threat in the Islamic world.

The United States now has to make a fundamental strategic decision. If it remains committed to its current strategy, it cannot respond to the Russians. If it does not respond to the Russians for five or 10 years, the world will look very much like it did from 1945 to 1992. There will be another Cold War at the very least, with a peer power much poorer than the United States but prepared to devote huge amounts of money to national defense.

There are four broad U.S. options:

Attempt to make a settlement with Iran that would guarantee the neutral stability of Iraq and permit the rapid withdrawal of U.S. forces there. Iran is the key here. The Iranians might also mistrust a re-emergent Russia, and while Tehran might be tempted to work with the Russians against the Americans, Iran might consider an arrangement with the United States — particularly if the United States refocuses its attentions elsewhere. On the upside, this would free the U.S. from Iraq. On the downside, the Iranians might not want —or honor — such a deal.
Enter into negotiations with the Russians, granting them the sphere of influence they want in the former Soviet Union in return for guarantees not to project Russian power into Europe proper. The Russians will be busy consolidating their position for years, giving the U.S. time to re-energize NATO. On the upside, this would free the United States to continue its war in the Islamic world. On the downside, it would create a framework for the re-emergence of a powerful Russian empire that would be as difficult to contain as the Soviet Union.
Refuse to engage the Russians and leave the problem to the Europeans. On the upside, this would allow the United States to continue war in the Islamic world and force the Europeans to act. On the downside, the Europeans are too divided, dependent on Russia and dispirited to resist the Russians. This strategy could speed up Russia’s re-emergence.
Rapidly disengage from Iraq, leaving a residual force there and in Afghanistan. The upside is that this creates a reserve force to reinforce the Baltics and Ukraine that might restrain Russia in the former Soviet Union. The downside is that it would create chaos in the Islamic world, threatening regimes that have sided with the United States and potentially reviving effective intercontinental terrorism. The trade-off is between a hegemonic threat from Eurasia and instability and a terror threat from the Islamic world.
We are pointing to very stark strategic choices. Continuing the war in the Islamic world has a much higher cost now than it did when it began, and Russia potentially poses a far greater threat to the United States than the Islamic world does. What might have been a rational policy in 2001 or 2003 has now turned into a very dangerous enterprise, because a hostile major power now has the option of making the U.S. position in the Middle East enormously more difficult.

If a U.S. settlement with Iran is impossible, and a diplomatic solution with the Russians that would keep them from taking a hegemonic position in the former Soviet Union cannot be reached, then the United States must consider rapidly abandoning its wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and redeploying its forces to block Russian expansion. The threat posed by the Soviet Union during the Cold War was far graver than the threat posed now by the fragmented Islamic world. In the end, the nations there will cancel each other out, and militant organizations will be something the United States simply has to deal with. This is not an ideal solution by any means, but the clock appears to have run out on the American war in the Islamic world.

We do not expect the United States to take this option. It is difficult to abandon a conflict that has gone on this long when it is not yet crystal clear that the Russians will actually be a threat later. (It is far easier for an analyst to make such suggestions than it is for a president to act on them.) Instead, the United States will attempt to bridge the Russian situation with gestures and half measures.

Nevertheless, American national strategy is in crisis. The United States has insufficient power to cope with two threats and must choose between the two. Continuing the current strategy means choosing to deal with the Islamic threat rather than the Russian one, and that is reasonable only if the Islamic threat represents a greater danger to American interests than the Russian threat does. It is difficult to see how the chaos of the Islamic world will cohere to form a global threat. But it is not difficult to imagine a Russia guided by the Medvedev Doctrine rapidly becoming a global threat and a direct danger to American interests.

We expect no immediate change in American strategic deployments — and we expect this to be regretted later. However, given U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney’s trip to the Caucasus region, now would be the time to see some movement in U.S. foreign policy. If Cheney isn’t going to be talking to the Russians, he needs to be talking to the Iranians. Otherwise, he will be writing checks in the region that the U.S. is in no position to cash.

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