Bosnia and Herzegovina (B&H) is confronted with practically permanent major disagreements between national political elites, even about marginal issues. Problems are particularly pronounced on the Sarajevo - Banja Luka level. Namely, two constitutional entities (Federation of B&H and Republika Srpska) of this dysfunctional (con) federal state, are constantly trying to either strengthen state competencies or secede. The last elections on October 7, 2018, with the huge victories of ‘nationalist' political parties in both entities, are just an additional proof of these tendencies. And the Kosovo problem, although interpreted by the West as a special case and not a precedent, sends a message about a possible change of boundaries. Also, disputes between the Macedonian and Albanian ethnic communities are almost constant.
It seems that international, or Western, involvement in relations in the Western Balkans region while preventing armed conflicts, is insufficient to lead to sustainable, majority-accepted solutions. Serbia's relations with the West are a special problem because anti-Western rhetoric and majority orientation of the public opinion keep the country in a certain distance towards the United States and the countries of Western Europe. For example, support for EU accession is relatively low (barely two-fifths), while only about a tenth of the population supports integration in NATO. The Albanian elites are increasingly dissatisfied because of the inability to create a single state, which would include Kosovo (and possibly part of Western Macedonia). The creation of a nation in Kosovo is in a more advanced phase, and Tirana could soon de facto face Kosovo as a distinct nation, in the European sense of the word (the case when a certain part of the community that shares the same language, religion and a good deal of narrative with its other part turns into a special boundary-bound state and nation; indicative are examples of Moldova and Montenegro).
The partial changes in the borders in the Western Balkans have recently been proposed by prominent authors, such as Timothy Less (https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/bosnia-herzegovina/2016-12-20/dysfunction-balkans), Daniel Serwer (https://www.cfr.org/report/unraveling-balkans-peace-agreements), Steven Meyer (https://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKL1326714620070413 http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/the-risks-of-an-imposed-settlement-1520?page=show) or John Schindler (http://observer.com/2017/05/vladimir-putin-russia-balkans-threat/). In addition, the problematic influence of non-Western powers (Russia and Turkey) in the Balkans is addressed in articles of Ted Galen Carpenter (http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-skeptics/old-nightmare-returns-the-balkans-simmer-again-21192?page=show) and Vuk Vuksanović (http://nationalinterest.org/feature/how-the-balkans-were-won-turkish-foreign-policy-success-22771?page=show). However, they did not mention an important part of this great equation, which is the westernization of Serbia, which could be desirable as a result of such a process. The stabilization of the entire region, as an additional product of this project, is something that both authors have correctly emphasized.
Let's assume that Serbia is allowed to integrate most of the territory of the Republika Srpska, and that at the same time Albania gets unified with Kosovo. Simultaneously, Serbia would submit an application for NATO membership by starting its MAP plan, which this military-political alliance should support.
These three strictly packaged and interdependent acts would produce tectonic changes in the Western Balkans. Serbia would necessarily and probably irreversibly turn to the US and Western Europe, while certain strong opposition from Russia might lead to a lasting deterioration of Moscow-Belgrade relations. Something similar happened after the end of the First World War (1918), when the Serbian elite held pronounced Anglophile (and Francophile) orientations. The recognition of Kosovo and its admission to the UN would not be necessary since Kosovo would not be a separate state, and Serbia would continue to have regular relations with (now-expanded) Albania.
The question is who would not benefit from such a solution? In addition to the aforementioned official Moscow, partly dissatisfied could be Bosniaks and Croatia. In the case of Croatia, or Bosnian Croats, the solution should be sought in an additional constitutionally defined protection of their collective rights within the existing Federation of B&H (which includes ten cantons). The problem with the Bosniaks could be solved by territorial concessions by Serbs. Namely, two critical points for Bosniaks are: East Sarajevo and the route Ključ-Jajce (which effectively connects the Una-Sana Canton and the Central Bosnia Canton), which could, together with the territory southwest of that corridor, become part of the Federation of B&H (it is territory of about 1.5 thousand km2 or 3% of B&H's total area). The Brčko District could remain what it currently is: a condominium, or the common territory of Serbia and the Federation of B&H (and could become the seat of some regional initiatives and organizations). An additional mitigating circumstance for the Bosniak elites is that B&H's dysfunctional structure is practically linked to its state level, not entities' one (see: EU must recognize new force for Balkan's destabilization; https://euobserver.com/opinion/143402). Namely, the current constitution of the Federation of B&H includes mechanisms that prevent the permanent blocking of decisions (for example, there are no cantonal vetoes, while possible complaints of representatives of one of the clubs of the constitutional nations go to the Federation of B&H Constitutional Court, which is still relatively functional). The possible demarcation of Macedonians and Albanians in Macedonia, where the current plurality of one of the two ethnic groups in the municipalities would be a criterion, could also prove to be a recipe for stability (municipalities with relative Albanian majority would be attached to a newly-enlarged Albania).
Such a reconfiguration would lead to a situation comparable to European practice in which the national state, with one dominant nation and national minorities with different modalities of the protection of rights, is practically a norm of the state organization. That reconfiguration would not imply any "human displacement" or "population exchange" and would imply the continuation of all acquired minority rights under new circumstances (with a desirable accompanying series of agreements on more detailed regulation of relations in the spheres of economy, social rights, culture, etc).
It is essential that the West, meaning Washington and Brussels, are the main creators of the 'new order'. A 'historic agreement' would happen at a conference similar to Dayton, where heads of state or government (Serbia, Federation of B&H, Albania, and possibly Macedonia) would not be dissolved without the final binding durable solution that the parliaments of the same countries would confirm. Additionally, NATO could serve as a security and stabilization guarantor.
Of course, the question is whether the "Great Deal" would bring peace and long-term good neighborly relations. All the chance is that this is a far greater chance than in the case of the status quo.