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Rusofobija

Nebojša Milikić RSS / 05.05.2014. u 12:12

autor teksta: Tomaž Mastnak

Da li smo opet u hladnom ratu? Prijateljica koja predaje u Njujorku noviju istoriju rekla je njenim studentima prošle nedelje da mogu zahvaliti američkoj vladi za posebnu ljubaznost jer im je u realnosti predstavila ovu vrstu političkog delovanja, koju bi inače morali da uče iz knjiga i dokumenata. Nekima od mojih američkih poznanika koji su doživeli prvi hladni rat se - tako mi kažu - od njegovog sadašnjeg oživljavanja povraća. Meni je sve to uglavnom novo. To ne znači da o tome ništa ne znam, samo sam bio pošteđen te vrste iskustva. Dok smo u bivšoj Jugoslaviji - nakon 1948 - imali prema Rusima opravdanu rezervisanost, nismo uzimali za ozbiljno ni američku političku propagandu iako smo inače konzumirali njihovu pop kulturu. Retorika hladnog rata bila je, više nego bilo što drugo, materijal za viceve. To sada uopšte nije smešno.

Putinu zapadni mediji (i istočnoevropski dileri njihove robe) nikada nisu pokazivali naklonost. Međutim, pisalo se i govorilo tako da se činilo da se radi o neprijateljstvu prema osobi, a ne prema državi koju zastupa: o antiputinizmu a ne rusofobiji. Na kraju krajeva, zapadna politička i medijska mašinerija imala je puno simpatija za Jeljcina. Čak je i prema Gorbačovu ova mašinerija pokazivala određenu naklonost - kako i ne bi ako znamo koga je smenio. Ali su ga jako zavrnuli kad su mu obećali da se NATO neće širiti prema istoku, zbog čega je on podržao ujedinjenje Nemačke. Da nije bilo tog verolomstva danas ne bi imali krizu u Ukrajini.

Putin je tip političkog lidera kojeg je teško voleti. Njegov autoritarizam ne uklapa se u zablude o slobodi, koje se preživaju na Zapadu. To je sasvim zadovoljavajuće objašnjenje zašto ne uživa simpatije zapadnih političara i medija. (Naravno, tu su i suštinskiji razlozi takvog odnosa prema ruskom predsedniku, ali ovde sam ih ostavio na stranu.) Ali erupcija rusofobije koju smo videli u proleće ove godine je nešto drugo. Odakle ona potiče?

Pre četvrt veka, kada se Jugoslavija počela raspadati, a raspad federalne države se pretvorio u rat, komentatori na Zapadu su rado govorili o staroj, drevnoj mržnji koja je ukorenjena na Balkanu, o "balkanskim duhovima" koji su jedva čekali da stupe na scenu i zaplešu krvavi ples. Kakvo lagano, čisto, opšterazumljivo i uverljivo objašnjenje! A kakva zločinačka glupost! Zločinačka jer je učinila da uništavanje bude duže i teže nego što bi verovatno bilo, samo da je takozvana međunarodna zajednica imala trunku zdravog razuma. Svako ko je pratio zbivanja u to vreme, mogao je videti kako se stvarala mržnja, iz dana u dan i iz godine u godinu. Mržnja je uvek stvorena. Čak i kad se javlja vrlo brzo, nikad nije stvorena preko noći. I nikad tek kao odgovor na čin ili događaj. Ona je uvek odgovor koji je izabran, osmišljen i proveden. Ona je odgovor u koji je uložen politički rad.

Rusofobija, čiji smo svedoci, nije spontana reakcija na zbivanja u Ukrajini. Pa čak i sa svim novim komunikacijskim tehnologijama nije je bilo moguće napraviti preko noći. Isto tako ne vjerujem, ako mogu tako reći, da je izvađena iz zamrzivača, gde smo je ostavili nakon pada Berlinskog zida i raspada Sovjetskog Saveza. Šta ako smo sve ove godine živeli s njom? Kao što se mržnja uvek konstruiše, tako mora biti dekonstruisana ako nećemo više da živimo s njom. Hladni rat nikada nije bio demontiran, rasklopljen i uklonjen. Samo je ono što smo nazvali velikom pobedom u hladnom ratu, produženo na više od dvadeset godina. Dve decenije smo živeli u hladnoratovskom trijumfalizmu, što znači da smo još uvek živeli u hladnom ratu.

Ali u kakvoj su vezi hladni rat i rusofobija? Hladni rat je bio više od rusofobije. Hladni rat je bio sukob Zapada, koji je sebe nazivao slobodnim svetom, sa komunizmom. Ako se osvrnemo na SAD, koje su dirigovale hladnim ratom, rusofobija je bila prezentacija hladnog rata namenjena masovnoj potrošnji. Komunizam su bili Rusi, a ne ideologija, koja je zagovarala drugačiji politički sistem i drugačiju organizaciju društva i ekonomije. Ideologija je preteška i preopasna hrana za raju. Raji treba onemogućiti i samu pomisao na mogućnost alternativnih društvenih i političkih sistema. Uspešna ideologija se ne zapliće u ideološke rasprave. Suprotstavljene ideologije ne prikazuje kao nešto što ima svoju logiku, već pre kao bezumnu osobinu onih drugih koji ne dele sa nama ono što mi prihvatamo kao prirodno. Kad su ljudi koji sada imaju u rukama vrhove američke političke i ekonomske moći bili učenici, oni su se na drilovima iz samozaštite skrivali pod klupicama od Rusa, a ne od komunizma.

Osnovna logika hladnog rata je, dakle, antikomunizam. Dok je američka vlada narod zastrašivala Rusima, progonila je domaće komuniste ili različite disidente koje je osumnjičila ili optuživala da su komunisti. Taj teror je personifikovan, identifikovan je sa Mek Kartijem (McCarthy). Mek Karti je otišao, ali nije bilo nikakve demekkartizacije. Nikakvog političkog procesa, analognog denacifikaciji, nemačkom posleratnom obračunu s nacizmom, sa kojim hladni rat deli fundamentalistički antikomunizam. Ironija u današnjoj situaciji je da je fundamentalistički antikomunizam opstao a komunizam propao. Antikomunizam se sada hrani rusofobijom, živi kao popularni šou o samom sebi iz herojskog razdoblja hladnog rata. Jednostavno rečeno, ostali su samo Rusi, ostala je samo rusofobija.

Dogodilo se, međutim, i nešto drugo, što prevazilazi ironiju i što se može objasniti antikomunističkim srodstvom hladnog rata i nacizma. Raspirivači hladnog rata iz našeg slobodnog sveta su se sada u rusofobiji povezali sa ukrajinskom nacistima. Izgleda kao da je hladni rat u ovom svom novom početku anulirao Drugi svetski rat. Drugi svetski rat kao rat protiv nacifašizma, u kom su glavni hladnoratovski neprijatelji bili saveznici, istinski kvari i ometa temeljnu logiku hladnog rata. Da bi hladni rat danas sakupio dovoljno energije za svoj razmah i uspeh mora uspostaviti kontinuitet s antikomunizmom od pre Drugog svetskog rata. Po istoj logici bi se suprotstavljanje novom početku Hladnog rata moralo osloniti na tradiciju antifašizma. 

prevod sa slovenačkog (neautorizovan): N. Milikić

izvor: http://www.dnevnik.si/mnenja/kolumne/rusofobija

 



Komentari (82)

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Goran Vučković Goran Vučković 14:41 05.05.2014

Vic

Kaže video meda vrapca kako leži na leđima sa nogicama na gore, pa ga pita: "Vrapče, što tako ležiš" - a vrabac kaže: "čuo sam da će nebo da padne, pa kao rekoh da pripomognem da se zadrži".

Lepo je što pokušavaš da "u skladu sa mogućnostima" skreneš pažnju na (pred)ratnu propagandu. Nadam se da će se ova gužva izduvati s vremenom.
Nebojša Milikić Nebojša Milikić 15:53 05.05.2014

Re: Vic

Goran Vučković
Kaže video meda vrapca kako leži na leđima sa nogicama na gore, pa ga pita: "Vrapče, što tako ležiš" - a vrabac kaže: "čuo sam da će nebo da padne, pa kao rekoh da pripomognem da se zadrži".

Lepo je što pokušavaš da "u skladu sa mogućnostima" skreneš pažnju na (pred)ratnu propagandu. Nadam se da će se ova gužva izduvati s vremenom.



zahvaljujem na komplimentu i, uzgred, primecujem da nebo ipak nije palo : ))
Srđan Fuchs Srđan Fuchs 16:48 05.05.2014

коректан текст

обе стране у сукобу носе потенцијално језиве ноте, умрљане у доктринарно црнило. ја сам имао занимљиву епизоду данас - ходао у црвеној мајици с бело-плаво-црвеном тробојком... тек у једном моменту пролазим кроз скупину Амера, која поприлично некултурно стоји препречујући осталима пролаз кроз једну археолошку локацију. тек, пресецам кроз њих дрито, тек неко ће - oh my, we're obviously at the wrong part of the world, these Russians are everywhere. ја се кретао с групом Словенаца, а на маји је била тробојка ватрогасне бригаде из Кочевја, Словеније. иначе волим да радим у тој маји јер појавом тучем по предрасудама Западњака (и Словенци били резервисани на почетку дана што носим руску тробојку на плећима - док Хрвати регуларно виде србоћетнићку заставицу - моја омиљена маја, добијо од једног cool slovenskog gasilca) .
highshalfbooze highshalfbooze 18:32 05.05.2014

Re: коректан текст

Словенци били резервисани на почетку дана

Hoćeš da kažeš da ti ljudi neznaju koje su boje na zastavi njihove sopstvene zemlje od njihovog rođenja do danas?

hajkula1 hajkula1 20:01 05.05.2014

Re: коректан текст

Srđan Fuchs
обе стране у сукобу носе потенцијално језиве ноте, умрљане у доктринарно црнило. ја сам имао занимљиву епизоду данас - ходао у црвеној мајици с бело-плаво-црвеном тробојком... тек у једном моменту пролазим кроз скупину Амера, која поприлично некултурно стоји препречујући осталима пролаз кроз једну археолошку локацију. тек, пресецам кроз њих дрито, тек неко ће - oh my, we're obviously at the wrong part of the world, these Russians are everywhere. ја се кретао с групом Словенаца, а на маји је била тробојка ватрогасне бригаде из Кочевја, Словеније. иначе волим да радим у тој маји јер појавом тучем по предрасудама Западњака (и Словенци били резервисани на почетку дана што носим руску тробојку на плећима - док Хрвати регуларно виде србоћетнићку заставицу - моја омиљена маја, добијо од једног cool slovenskog gasilca) .



srpska i ruska zastava imaju obrnuto raspoređene boje

srpska crveno, plavo, belo a ruska, belo, plavo, crveno (odozgo na dole)

srpska sa belim orlom a ruska sa žutim tj zlatnim


Srđan Fuchs Srđan Fuchs 22:59 05.05.2014

Re: коректан текст

ma, zastavica je mala, tektek se vidi, a ima shlem vatrogasne brigade, zlatne boje, iz kochevja umesto triglava na trobojci. poenta je da ogromna, ali ogromna masa ljudi vidi sopstvenu predrasudu - znachi, ja sam istochnjak, nosim te boje, i onda svako vidi svoje predrasude pre prave boje - kochevje pishe sitnim i neprimetnim slovima za nepazljivog posmatracha. uglavnom ja obozavam tu maju jer mi je u sto situacija pokazala koliko je glupava kolektivna psihoza ili slepilo.
predatortz predatortz 11:09 06.05.2014

Re: коректан текст

Srđan Fuchs


Nemoj ti meni Slovenci, ovo,ono...
Pusti Ruse, oni će već sami da se snađu.
Ovo ti promoviši

LINK
charlie charlie 12:48 06.05.2014

Re: коректан текст

Srđan Fuchs
обе стране у сукобу носе потенцијално језиве ноте, умрљане у доктринарно црнило. ја сам имао занимљиву епизоду данас - ходао у црвеној мајици с бело-плаво-црвеном тробојком... тек у једном моменту пролазим кроз скупину Амера, која поприлично некултурно стоји препречујући осталима пролаз кроз једну археолошку локацију. тек, пресецам кроз њих дрито, тек неко ће - oh my, we're obviously at the wrong part of the world, these Russians are everywhere. ја се кретао с групом Словенаца, а на маји је била тробојка ватрогасне бригаде из Кочевја, Словеније. иначе волим да радим у тој маји јер појавом тучем по предрасудама Западњака (и Словенци били резервисани на почетку дана што носим руску тробојку на плећима - док Хрвати регуларно виде србоћетнићку заставицу - моја омиљена маја, добијо од једног cool slovenskog gasilca) .

Када ти већ "лепе", онда набави мајицу у правим, српски бојама.
blogovatelj blogovatelj 17:12 06.05.2014

Re: коректан текст

ходао у црвеној мајици с бело-плаво-црвеном тробојком


Moj sin ima majicu sa obrnutim redosledom boja i srpskim grbom na njoj.
I pre par godina, mi na metro stanici u Montrealu, izašli iz voza. On se nešto mota da kupi neke sitnice, a ja malo podalje sedim i čekam ga.
I primetim da ga jedan tip fiksira pogledom. Pomislio sam garantovano je neki Vathr.
Pošto je sinak ušao u prodavnicu, taj lik se okrene i krene svojim poslom.
Posle par minuta izlazimo iz stanice, kad opet izroni onaj i opet fiksira pogledom.
I priđe sinku i kaže "izvini, jel mogu da te pitam, kakva ti je to majica"
Kad je dobio odgovor reče da je Rus i da mu sve ličilo na ruski grb i zastavu, vidi da nije isto, ali mu nije bilo jasno šta je, pa je morao da pita.
Srđan Fuchs Srđan Fuchs 18:27 06.05.2014

Re: коректан текст

predatortz


Nemoj ti meni Slovenci, ovo,ono...
Pusti Ruse, oni će već sami da se snađu.
Ovo ti promoviši

LINK


pa, ja i radim uglavnom sa studentarijom iz BL, pitaj njih, oni me zovu "otac Srdjan" iz zajebancije. ta deca su mi jedan od najvoljenijih klijenata ovde... a to, medijska prezentacija i to, to radi vasa matora ekipa... ja sam uglavnom teren, druzenje, opustenost, love n alcohol...
Srđan Fuchs Srđan Fuchs 18:29 06.05.2014

Re: коректан текст

charlie

Када ти већ "лепе", онда набави мајицу у правим, српски бојама.

to mi je previse strejtaski, bolje je da bude neka intrigantna provokacija, a ne pratis moj fb, matori, inace mi ne bi prebacivao za srpsku trobojku u jrslm.
Srđan Fuchs Srđan Fuchs 18:36 06.05.2014

Re: коректан текст

blogovatelj


Pomislio sam garantovano je neki Vathr.


da, da, tu ste bas u nebranom grozdju, u vasoj zemlji, tu im je najbogatija koncentracija, mislim ono, ratlines i to...


Kad je dobio odgovor reče da je Rus i da mu sve ličilo na ruski grb i zastavu, vidi da nije isto, ali mu nije bilo jasno šta je, pa je morao da pita.

daj, ovo ne moze biti! svi Rusi znaju za nas i znaju da smo im najveci prijatelji u svetu.
charlie charlie 22:47 06.05.2014

Re: коректан текст

Srđan Fuchs
charlie

Када ти већ "лепе", онда набави мајицу у правим, српски бојама.

to mi je previse strejtaski, bolje je da bude neka intrigantna provokacija, a ne pratis moj fb, matori, inace mi ne bi prebacivao za srpsku trobojku u jrslm.

Пратим ја твој рад (на блогу) и не могу да кажем да сам незадовољан !
Srđan Fuchs Srđan Fuchs 11:20 07.05.2014

Re: коректан текст

hoochie coochie man hoochie coochie man 20:35 05.05.2014

..........

Hladni rat je bio više od rusofobije...........Osnovna logika hladnog rata je, dakle, antikomunizam

A sada je od svega toga ostala samo rusofobija

ostala je samo rusofobija.


Ne čini mi se to baš uverljivim, biće da ima nešto što je zamenilo antikomunizam, i da je to nešto osnovna logika pojačane rusofobije.
To nešto sigurno nije ništa od velikih priča o ljudskim pravima, suverenitetima, integritetima..ništa od bilo kakvih izlizanih priča o principima.

A šta je to nešto, zašto je Zapadu toliko smeta Rusija da je spreman i za novi hladni rat, koji sigurno ne može proći bezbolno ni po njega, je ono milionsko pitanje.
Da li su to zaista težnje da se ruski resursi stave pod kontrolu, tj da se ne kupuju nego da se nekako dobiju ili otmu, ili je u pitanju nešto drugo, teško je odgonetnuti, ali nije verovatno da je trenutna rusofobija samo inercija one antikomunističke koja je slučajno dobila na intenzitetu.
Nebojša Milikić Nebojša Milikić 22:39 05.05.2014

Re: ..........

hoochie coochie man
Hladni rat je bio više od rusofobije...........Osnovna logika hladnog rata je, dakle, antikomunizam

A sada je od svega toga ostala samo rusofobija

ostala je samo rusofobija.


Ne čini mi se to baš uverljivim, biće da ima nešto što je zamenilo antikomunizam, i da je to nešto osnovna logika pojačane rusofobije.
To nešto sigurno nije ništa od velikih priča o ljudskim pravima, suverenitetima, integritetima..ništa od bilo kakvih izlizanih priča o principima.

A šta je to nešto, zašto je Zapadu toliko smeta Rusija da je spreman i za novi hladni rat, koji sigurno ne može proći bezbolno ni po njega, je ono milionsko pitanje.
Da li su to zaista težnje da se ruski resursi stave pod kontrolu, tj da se ne kupuju nego da se nekako dobiju ili otmu, ili je u pitanju nešto drugo, teško je odgonetnuti, ali nije verovatno da je trenutna rusofobija samo inercija one antikomunističke koja je slučajno dobila na intenzitetu.


mislim da je ovo "to nesto", samo sto je vec postalo ranga "usuda" i ne zna covek sta je gore, kad poznaje problematiku u detalje, ili je razmatra ovako, malo idealisticki i naivno kao ovde u clanku http://www.advance.hr/vijesti/kroz-povijest-do-danas-imperijalizam-kao-uzrok-svakog-zla/
oskar-z-wild oskar-z-wild 21:56 05.05.2014

Ko normalan nije rusofob?

I Kina je bila komunistička zemlja suprostavljena Zapadu, ali anglo-saksonski mediji nikad nisu bili sumnjičavi prema Kinezima kao što su bili prema Rusima.

Stvar je u tome što su Kinezi mirni i tihi ljudi, kod kojih je uvek business as usual na prvom mestu, a Rusi su uvek ekstravagantni Slavjani koji spašavaju svet poput Gorbačova, rasprodaju državu kao Jelcin pajac, kupuju najreprezentativnije britanske fudbal timove, kupuju umetnička dela za basnoslovne sume, najveće jahte, šetaju najviđenije žene, ubijaju se polonijumom u suši barovima u Londonu, izvršavaju samoubistva, itd itd.

I na kraju kao vrhunac svega mlažnjavju teritoriju suverene zemlje - tako što od proglasa svoje namere, za mesec dana organizuju političku kampanju i stvore političku volju kod naroda, dobiju zeleno svetlo od svoje Dume, organizuju referendum, proglase otcepljenje, pa proglase nezavisnost, i onda proglase pripijanje majčici Rusiji, i Duma lupi pečat. Koja efikasnost! I pri svemu tome svi internacionalni zakoni ispoštovani. Nema šta. Ako je mogao Buš mogu i Rusi.

Nesimpatičan narod ti Rusi. Sretam ih po Londonu. Svi su veoma važni i uspešni. Njihov najveći problem je kompleks veličine stvoren tom okolnošću da je Rusija najveća zemlja na svetu. To im daje opravdanje na ličnom nivou da se osećaju superiorni u odnosu na sve druge narode na svetu. Ukrajinci su za njih ništa osim kao neka njihova podgrupa. Srbi su im krajne nezanimljivi kao narod.

Ali osim Amerike, Ruse najviše privlače Britanci i to zato što je Britanska imperija kontrolisala veći deo planete nego Rusija (kad se uzmu u obzir mora i okeani), zato što Britanija još uvek ima kraljicu i ogromno bogatstvo, i neku višu aristokratsku klasu sa pedigreom.

Naravno treba biti fer i reći da osim ogromne teritorije Rusija ima i veliku kulturu zahvaljujući Rusima, Tatarima, Ukrajincima, Nemcima, Jevrejima... što doprinosi komleksu više vrednosti.

I na kraju priče stiže Ujka Putin (kako ga sad zovu, kao zamena za Ujka Sema) koji reši da potvrdi da Rusi ne samo da su sposobni nego i da su opasni, i da su Anglo-saksonci bili sve vreme u pravu: BEWARE OF THE RUSSIAN BEAR!
freehand freehand 22:29 05.05.2014

Re: Ko normalan nije rusofob?

Stvar je u tome što su Kinezi mirni i tihi ljudi, kod kojih je uvek business as usual na prvom mestu, a Rusi su uvek ekstravagantni Slavjani koji spašavaju svet poput Gorbačova, rasprodaju državu kao Jelcin pajac, kupuju najreprezentativnije britanske fudbal timove, kupuju umetnička dela za basnoslovne sume, najveće jahte, šetaju najviđenije žene, ubijaju se polonijumom u suši barovima u Londonu, izvršavaju samoubistva, itd itd.


...
milojep milojep 01:51 06.05.2014

Re: Ko normalan nije rusofob?

oskar-z-wild
...osim Amerike, Ruse najviše privlače Britanci i to zato što je Britanska imperija kontrolisala veći deo planete nego Rusija (kad se uzmu u obzir mora i okeani), zato što Britanija još uvek ima kraljicu i ogromno bogatstvo, i neku višu aristokratsku klasu sa pedigreom.


Gadna stvar taj imperijalizam! Što ne posvedočiš malo i o Britancima (Englezima), i kako sa njima i ne treba da ulaziš u polemike. Oni su ubeđeni da imaju tapiju na istinu! I ta medijska podela o kojoj pričaš a po pitanju Rusije, nema nikakve veze sa njihovim iskonskim stavom da Rusima treba stati za vrat. To će podržati kako onaj sa titulom ser tako i onaj pijani izgoreli gologuzan sa grckih ostrva.
oskar-z-wild oskar-z-wild 22:07 05.05.2014

Tomaž

Nisam siguran da li razumem šta hoće Tomaž Mastnak da kaže gore.

Njega se sećam iz ranih 90tih kada je bio aktivan kao podržavalac slovenačke nezavisnosti. Pisao je za anti-ratne fanzine u Sloveniji, Americi i Evropi.
Goran Vučković Goran Vučković 22:16 05.05.2014

Re: Tomaž

Nisam siguran da li razumem šta hoće Tomaž Mastnak da kaže gore.

Zar je bitno? Ti si rekao šta si spremio bez obzira na njegov tekst.
oskar-z-wild oskar-z-wild 22:30 05.05.2014

Rusofobija u medijima

Ko čita štampu na internetu na engleskom jeziku (uključujući kineske, indijske, arapske i druge internet sajtove) videće da su komentari čitalaca podeljeni skoro 50-50 na one koji odobravaju ruske postupke na Krimu i Ukrajini, i one koji se protive.

U ovom momentu u svetu vlada anti-američko raspoloženje kojem su doprineli svi postupci američke vlade od 1990 do danas. Primećujem da su svi Muslimani u Britaniji, koje srećem, veoma srećni što je Putin pokazao prst Amerikancima okupacijom Krima.

Ne vidim izraženu Rusofobiju ni u britanskim dnevnim novinama. Ćlanci obazrivo uzimaju u obzir ruske stavove. Ali što je najvažnije, vesti iz Ukrajine (čak i kad se dešavao Krim) nisu stalno bile na prvim stranicama dnevnih novina. Nekim danima nije bilo ni jednog članku o Ukrajini u nekim novinama.

Svi oni koji znaju kako su britanski mediji propraćivali ratove u Hrvatskoj, Bosni, Iraku, Kosovu, Afganistanu, itd. -- sa skoro neprestanom pokrivenošću na radiju i TV -- primetiće ovog puta da Anglo-saksonci ne žele da pripreme svoje narode i države za rat radi Ukrajine i Krima. Rusofobija nije izraženije sada prisutnija u medijima nego što je bila u poslednjim decenijama.

ALI to ne znači da će Rusija proći lako, Zapad će sačekati nekoliko godina, i u međuvremenu će pripremiti kaznu. Sačekaće da recesija, koja je počela ovog kvartala, počne da grize.

Obama sigurno nije čovek koji će da ratuje sa Rusijom, ali zato će sledeći američki predsednik sigurno biti ratnički raspoložen. Već se pominje treći Buš - onaj guverner Floride koga se sećamo kad su bili oni tesni predsednički izbori u Americi.
freehand freehand 22:52 05.05.2014

Re: Rusofobija u medijima

Već se pominje treći Buš - onaj guverner Floride koga se sećamo kad su bili oni tesni predsednički izbori u Americi.

O Bože,,,
Nebojša Milikić Nebojša Milikić 22:53 05.05.2014

Re: Rusofobija u medijima

oskar-z-wild
Ko čita štampu na internetu na engleskom jeziku (uključujući kineske, indijske, arapske i druge internet sajtove) videće da su komentari čitalaca podeljeni skoro 50-50 na one koji odobravaju ruske postupke na Krimu i Ukrajini, i one koji se protive.

U ovom momentu u svetu vlada anti-američko raspoloženje kojem su doprineli svi postupci američke vlade od 1990 do danas. Primećujem da su svi Muslimani u Britaniji, koje srećem, veoma srećni što je Putin pokazao prst Amerikancima okupacijom Krima.

Ne vidim izraženu Rusofobiju ni u britanskim dnevnim novinama. Ćlanci obazrivo uzimaju u obzir ruske stavove. Ali što je najvažnije, vesti iz Ukrajine (čak i kad se dešavao Krim) nisu stalno bile na prvim stranicama dnevnih novina. Nekim danima nije bilo ni jednog članku o Ukrajini u nekim novinama.

Svi oni koji znaju kako su britanski mediji propraćivali ratove u Hrvatskoj, Bosni, Iraku, Kosovu, Afganistanu, itd. -- sa skoro neprestanom pokrivenošću na radiju i TV -- primetiće ovog puta da Anglo-saksonci ne žele da pripreme svoje narode i države za rat radi Ukrajine i Krima. Rusofobija nije izraženije sada prisutnija u medijima nego što je bila u poslednjim decenijama.

ALI to ne znači da će Rusija proći lako, Zapad će sačekati nekoliko godina, i u međuvremenu će pripremiti kaznu. Sačekaće da recesija, koja je počela ovog kvartala, počne da grize.

Obama sigurno nije čovek koji će da ratuje sa Rusijom, ali zato će sledeći američki predsednik sigurno biti ratnički raspoložen. Već se pominje treći Buš - onaj guverner Floride koga se sećamo kad su bili oni tesni predsednički izbori u Americi.


(ma sta me briga, izdrzacu jos blog ili dva, ioanko ce se posle toga sve raspasti...)
oskar-z-wild oskar-z-wild 23:03 05.05.2014

Re: Rusofobija u medijima

Nema kvik fiksa. Ili pravi duže pauze između blogova. Ali dobro je da se razvoj situacije prati. Moja preporuka za seriju. Nisam se ovako dobro svađao godinama.
Kraja Kraja 23:03 05.05.2014

Re: Rusofobija u medijima

svi postupci američke vlade od 1990 do danas


...samo od 1990...???
...alzheimer...???
...demencija...???
oskar-z-wild oskar-z-wild 23:18 05.05.2014

Re: Rusofobija u medijima

Kraja
svi postupci američke vlade od 1990 do danas
...samo od 1990...???...alzheimer...???...demencija...???


In living memory, što se kaže, a svet oko nas je sve mlađi.

vrabac_u_steni vrabac_u_steni 23:23 05.05.2014

Re: Rusofobija u medijima

Kraja
svi postupci američke vlade od 1990 do danas


...samo od 1990...???
...alzheimer...???
...demencija...???


ne, ništa od toga, problem je nažalost mnogo ozbiljniji
freehand freehand 23:36 05.05.2014

Re: Rusofobija u medijima

vrabac_u_steni
Kraja
svi postupci američke vlade od 1990 do danas


...samo od 1990...???
...alzheimer...???
...demencija...???


ne, ništa od toga, problem je nažalost mnogo ozbiljniji

Mrtva je trka: Filip The Prva Srbija upravo je otkrio šta mu smeta u tome šta Rusija nudi:
Nisam fan kombinacije [pravosljaja i komunizma koji nudi Rusija i njihove verzije antifasizma koja vrlo podseca na fasizam

LINK NA KOMENTAR

Nekad zaista ne ostanem bez reči nego bez daha, čitajući ovakve stvari.
vrabac_u_steni vrabac_u_steni 23:48 05.05.2014

Re: Rusofobija u medijima

freehand
vrabac_u_steni
Kraja
svi postupci američke vlade od 1990 do danas


...samo od 1990...???
...alzheimer...???
...demencija...???


ne, ništa od toga, problem je nažalost mnogo ozbiljniji

Mrtva je trka: Filip The Prva Srbija upravo je otkrio šta mu smeta u tome šta Rusija nudi:
Nisam fan kombinacije [pravosljaja i komunizma koji nudi Rusija i njihove verzije antifasizma koja vrlo podseca na fasizam

LINK NA KOMENTAR
Nekad zaista ne ostanem bez reči nego bez daha, čitajući ovakve stvari.


pročitao komentar, kanda je malo depresivan, oziju se to nikada ne bi dogodilo. tako da...ne bih ja njih dvojicu u isti koš, filip ipak ostavlja utisak ljudskog bića, što verujem i jeste, a ovaj je kao što si i sam primetio nedavno, samo "ubagovani bot".
oskar-z-wild oskar-z-wild 23:48 05.05.2014

Re: Rusofobija u medijima

vrabac_u_steni
Kraja
svi postupci američke vlade od 1990 do danas
...samo od 1990...???...alzheimer...???...demencija...???
ne, ništa od toga, problem je nažalost mnogo ozbiljniji


Da li se možemo složiti da je Rimska imperija trajala oko 1500 godina +- nekoliko vekova? (Uzimajući u obzir i Vizantiju).

Kada se uporedi tehnološki nivo Rimsko-vizantijske imperije sa tehnološkim nivoom Američke imperije, onda je jasno da će Amerika vladati svetom ili barem velikim delom sveta još nekoliko hiljada godina. Zato nema mnogo smisla pamtiti sve agresije Amerike i Anglo-saksonske bratije.

Ono što je bitno Srbima je da se čuvaju podalje, da ne prave greške, i da uživaju u blagodatima evropske provincije. Kajmak, ćevap, izvori, med... rakija...čvarci mmmm
gorran2 gorran2 23:51 05.05.2014

Tehnološki čvarci

oskar-z-wild
vrabac_u_steni
Kraja
svi postupci američke vlade od 1990 do danas
...samo od 1990...???...alzheimer...???...demencija...???
ne, ništa od toga, problem je nažalost mnogo ozbiljniji


Da li se možemo složiti da je Rimska imperija trajala oko 1500 godina +- nekoliko vekova? (Uzimajući u obzir i Vizantiju).

Kada se uporedi tehnološki nivo Rimsko-vizantijske imperije sa tehnološkim nivoom Američke imperije, onda je jasno da će Amerika vladati svetom ili barem velikim delom sveta još nekoliko hiljada godina. Zato nema mnogo smisla pamtiti sve agresije Amerike i Anglo-saksonske bratije.

Ono što je bitno Srbima je da se čuvaju podalje, da ne prave greške, i da uživaju u blagodatima evropske provincije. Kajmak, ćevap, izvori, med... rakija...čvarci mmmm

Hm, visoko... osobita... logika
vrabac_u_steni vrabac_u_steni 00:03 06.05.2014

Re: Tehnološki čvarci

gorran2
oskar-z-wild
[

Ono što je bitno Srbima je da se čuvaju podalje, da ne prave greške, i da uživaju u blagodatima evropske provincije. Kajmak, ćevap, izvori, med... rakija...čvarci mmmm

Hm, visoko... osobita... logika


gorane, moram da ti priznam nešto teška srca, u pravu si, zaista ima nešto gnjilo u toj "četničkoj" logici.

(mada ti znaš da ja mislim da nisu baš svi u JVuO bili u tom fazonu)

no nebitno, samo za tebe:



oskar-z-wild oskar-z-wild 00:05 06.05.2014

Re: Tehnološki čvarci

Hm, visoko... osobita... logika


Pa naravno, bili smo rimska provincija i vizantijska provincija pa smo sve to preživeli. Preživećemo i nekoliko hiljada godina u evropskoj provinciji sa američkom vojnom bazom na Kosovu. Sve je cool.

Samo treba oladiti glave, pustiti Ruse da se bave sobom, jer se oni sigurno nisu bavili nama.

Cezaru cezarovo...

gorran2 gorran2 00:15 06.05.2014

Re: Tehnološki čvarci

vrabac_u_steni

Ma, namučih se s rečju. Nekako mi "logika" baš ne pasuje, a ne pada mi na pamet nešto preciznije...
freehand freehand 00:16 06.05.2014

Re: Tehnološki čvarci

gorran2
vrabac_u_steni

Ma, namučih se s rečju. Nekako mi "logika" baš ne pasuje, a ne pada mi na pamet nešto preciznije...

Logici smo ovde prekjuče davali četres dana.
hoochie coochie man hoochie coochie man 20:00 06.05.2014

Re: Rusofobija u medijima

primetiće ovog puta da Anglo-saksonci ne žele da pripreme svoje narode i države za rat radi Ukrajine i Krima.


Rusofobija je strah od Rusa, jel tako bi?

Strah, moj oskare, strah.

Ne ide se na Rusiju kao u svatove. Tako se može na Srbiju, na Irak, Avganitan, ali ne i na Rusiju.
Goran Vučković Goran Vučković 20:03 06.05.2014

Re: Rusofobija u medijima

Ne ide se na Rusiju kao u svatove. Tako se može na Srbiju, na Irak, Avganitan, ali ne i na Rusiju.

Doduše ni Avganistan nije naivan - pitaj Britance, Ruse i Amere
freehand freehand 20:23 06.05.2014

Re: Rusofobija u medijima

Goran Vučković
Ne ide se na Rusiju kao u svatove. Tako se može na Srbiju, na Irak, Avganitan, ali ne i na Rusiju.

Doduše ni Avganistan nije naivan - pitaj Britance, Ruse i Amere

Pa ni na Srbiju se tako ne ide.
hoochie coochie man hoochie coochie man 20:37 06.05.2014

Re: Rusofobija u medijima

Doduše ni Avganistan nije naivan - pitaj Britance, Ruse i Amere


A mislio sam da Avganistan izostavim, al, rekoh, hajd nek bude tri

omega68 omega68 22:48 05.05.2014

русофилија

болест најмилија
oskar-z-wild oskar-z-wild 22:55 05.05.2014

Re: русофилија

болест најмилија




Biti rusofil je nešto plemenito kad je u domenu kulture, naravno.
blogov_kolac blogov_kolac 07:39 06.05.2014

plaše ih ZLI DUSI, a ne RUSI

Država koja je većinu prošlog veka bila pojam za "imperiju zla", i nekoliko decenija predstavljala pravi pakao na zemlji za ogroman deo sopstvenog stanovništva, a gotovo isključivo donoseći nesreću svugde na planeti gde je mogla da uspostavi svoj iole snažniji i direktan uticaj - svoj jedini pravi istorijski pandan imala je u zloglasnom srednjevekovnom divljem mongolskom carstvu, koje je svojevremeno uspevalo u kontinuitetu da u dužem vremenskom periodu na ogromnom prostoru tada poznatog sveta zavija u crno takoreći sve čega se dotaklo, i svojom impresivnom vojnom snagom bilo u stanju da sebi pokori (ne zaboravimo da je Hitlerov Rajh, istorijski pojam za zlo koje neka država može da ostvari, vremenski trajao svega 10-ak godina, a da je Maova Kina bila izrazito samoizolovana zemlja, koja bez obzira na sav pakao koji je nosila u sebi nikada nije pokušavala agresivno da širi svoj usrećiteljski uticaj sa izuzetkom svoje baš najranije faze).

Za razliku od recimo Nemačke i Japana, koji su iz epizoda sopstvenog najvećeg istorijskog posrnuća (istina Nemci su to odradili tek u drugom pokušaju - prvi put su iz jednog zla na kraju prešli u nešto mnogo gore) izašli suočavanjem sa sopstvenom prošlošću, katarzom i politikom koja je trajna negacija one kojom su unesrećili bili pola sveta, sa Rusima to od početka njihovog "novog početka" to nikako nije bio slučaj. I prvo što su počeli njihovi vlastodršci da rade kada je država pukom srećom počela ekonomski da im staje na noge (zahvaljujući neviđenoj eksploziji cena energenata u XXI veku kojima su prebogati), bio je pokušaj revizije istorije pre svega sa akcentom na Staljinovu eru, a evo, sada najdirektnije pokušavaju na velika vrata da vrate politiku teritorijalne ekspanzije u odnosu na susede, a koja je vekovima funkcionisala u svetu sve dok se oružje nije toliko usavršilo da takvu politiku kao dominantnu čovečanstvo bukvalno biološki ne bi moglo da preživi, o čemu nam najbolje svedoče bilansi dva velika svetska rata iz prve polovine prošlog veka.

I sada se mi ovde u Srbiji iščuđavamo zašto pola sveta zazire zbog ovako snažnih znakova da bi neko opet da stvara nekakav novi CCCP na slično autoritarnim unutrašnjim osnovama, i da vrati na svetsku scenu definiciju rata kao "vođenje politike drugim sredstvima". Bolje da se priupitamo zašto smo mi jedina evropska zemlja kojoj je predsednik ruske Dume pohitao da se zahvali kako je njena javnost prihvatila i tumačila dosadašnja dešavanja u Ukrajini. Već četvrt veka smo ubeđeni da mi najbolje razumemo međunarodne (geo)političke procese, njihove uzroke i moguće posledice - a uvek se ispostavlja suprotno...
alselone alselone 07:42 06.05.2014

Re: plaše ih ZLI DUSI, a ne RUSI

svoj jedini pravi istorijski pandan imala je u zloglasnom srednjevekovnom divljem mongolskom carstvu, koje je svojevremeno uspevalo u kontinuitetu da u dužem vremenskom periodu na ogromnom prostoru tada poznatog sveta zavija u crno takoreći sve čega se dotaklo, i svojom impresivnom vojnom snagom bilo u stanju da sebi pokori (ne zaboravimo da je Hitlerov Rajh, istorijski pojam za zlo koje neka država može da ostvari, vremenski trajao svega 10-ak godina, a da je Maova Kina bila izrazito samoizolovana zemlja, koja bez obzira na sav pakao koji je nosila u sebi nikada nije pokušavala agresivno da širi svoj usrećiteljski uticaj sa izuzetkom svoje baš najranije faze).




Isuse boze, sta iz vas par ludaka izlazi na povrsinu ovih dana, ja samo idem po blogovima i smejem se.
blogov_kolac blogov_kolac 08:59 06.05.2014

Re: plaše ih ZLI DUSI, a ne RUSI

alselone

Isuse boze, sta iz vas par ludaka izlazi na povrsinu ovih dana, ja samo idem po blogovima i smejem se.

Taj Sovjetski Savez, kada se urušio, i postale su dostupnije javnosti njegove najmračnije strane i tajne - ispostavilo se da je u svojim podrumima i ormanima zapravo imao i više kostura nego što je iko pretpostavljao... ali naravno, takvim istorijskim činjenicama smeju se samosvesni Srbi, sve sami geopolitički barbarogeniji, koji su na vreme spoznali veliku istinu da je "Diznilend bio gori od GULAG-a" (i njoj slične "istine" ).

A opasnost po Ruse je danas jako ozbiljna da kao u mnogim periodima trajanja Sovjetskog Saveza budu kao nekakvi "novi Mongoli" u odnosu na normalniji ostatak planete - spektakularno impresivna vojna sila koja se prostire na nepreglednim prostranstvima, a duboko trula iznutra i pakleno opasna spolja - ako po najgorem scenariju punom snagom nastave stazom koju je svet ignorisao u Gruziji, a sada u Ukrajini sagledava sa svim njenim mogućim posledicama, ako se na vreme ne obuzda.

Naravno, tvoje je pravo da se diviš nečijoj mongoloidnoj politici u najavi, a one koji od nje zaziru smatraš ludacima.
freehand freehand 09:12 06.05.2014

Re: plaše ih ZLI DUSI, a ne RUSI

Naravno, tvoje je pravo da se diviš nečijoj mongoloidnoj politici u najavi, a one koji od nje zaziru smatraš ludacima.

Kad je reč o mongoloidnosti, poštovani kolega, meni se čini da vi zastupate neke prilično mongoloidne političke stavove.
A o istorijskim paralelama: u vreme mongolskih pohoda postojala je još jedna vojna sila - samo daleko bolje brendirana, mnogo šarenija i kao pljunuta slika tadašnje Međunarodne zajednice, koja je preplovljavala more nekoliko puta ne bi li uspostavila carstvo svog Boga. Kao i sada - svo zlato i druge napljačkane materijalne stvari bile su, naravno, samo kolateralna korist.
Ta je sila upravo sa Mongolima sklapala saveze, manje ili više uspešne, protiv svojih protivnika koji su, gle čuda - jedini bili na svojoj zemlji od te tri sile.
Priča se završila, u tom izvlačenju, u Akri 1291.


E sad, poštovani veleumni kolega - iz koliko ćeš puta da pogodiš - o kojoj je sili reč? I koja današnja sila je, na istim principima i na isti način nastavljač te tradicije?

BTW - moj favorit u čitavom tom galimatijasu apsolutno je sultan Baibars, koga su dobro upamtili njegovi protivnici sa obe strane.
alselone alselone 09:14 06.05.2014

Re: plaše ih ZLI DUSI, a ne RUSI

A opasnost po Ruse


Svidja mi se kako vas par entuzijasta najavljujete propast Rusije, "evo sad ce, jedan dan od nedelje".
oskar-z-wild oskar-z-wild 11:08 06.05.2014

Re: plaše ih ZLI DUSI, a ne RUSI

Nebojša, zamolio bih te da malo obratiš pažnju na nivo argumentacije koju koriste neki poput gospode Alselone i Freehand.

Da li bi mogao da malo moderiraš upotrebu reči "ludak" i "mongoloid". Kad se već vređamo zamolio bih blogere da budu malo intelektualno pronicljiviji i originalniji što se tiče uvreda.

Alselone bi mogao da primeti da niko ne predviđa skorašnji "propast Rusije" već da je Rusija svojim unilateralnim osvajanjem tuđe teritorije otvorila proces koji će trajati godinama ili decenijama, a koji može biti veoma štetan za dobrobit stanovnika Rusije. (Alselone, koji deo ti deo ove rečenice još nije jasan?)
freehand freehand 11:14 06.05.2014

Re: plaše ih ZLI DUSI, a ne RUSI

Nebojša, zamolio bih te da malo obratiš pažnju na nivo argumentacije koju koriste neki poput gospode Alselone i Freehand.

Da li bi mogao da malo moderiraš upotrebu reči "ludak" i "mongoloid".

Pardon, uvaženi kolega..
blogov_kolac
Naravno, tvoje je pravo da se diviš nečijoj mongoloidnoj politici u najavi, a one koji od nje zaziru smatraš ludacima.


alselone alselone 11:17 06.05.2014

Re: plaše ih ZLI DUSI, a ne RUSI

Nebojša, zamolio bih te da malo obratiš pažnju na nivo argumentacije koju koriste neki poput gospode Alselone i Freehand.

Da li bi mogao da malo moderiraš upotrebu reči "ludak" i "mongoloid". Kad se već vređamo zamolio bih blogere da budu malo intelektualno pronicljiviji i originalniji što se tiče uvreda.

Alselone bi mogao da primeti da niko ne predviđa skorašnji "propast Rusije" već da je Rusija svojim unilateralnim osvajanjem tuđe teritorije otvorila proces koji će trajati godinama ili decenijama, a koji može biti veoma štetan za dobrobit stanovnika Rusije. (Alselone, koji deo ti deo ove rečenice još nije jasan?)



Onda sam pogresio. Meni se ucinilo da si ti onaj pacijent koji je na vise blogova predvidjao skoru propast Rusije, od ekonomske, politicke pa do podele teritorije.
Sve je meni jasno sta ti pises, samo mi nije jasno kako je moguce da pises toliko glupo i da ti se toliko svidja da se svadjas i dolazis na svaki blog sa pripremljenim sastavima.
Nebojša Milikić Nebojša Milikić 11:21 06.05.2014

Re: plaše ih ZLI DUSI, a ne RUSI

freehand
Nebojša, zamolio bih te da malo obratiš pažnju na nivo argumentacije koju koriste neki poput gospode Alselone i Freehand.

Da li bi mogao da malo moderiraš upotrebu reči "ludak" i "mongoloid".

Pardon, uvaženi kolega..
blogov_kolac
Naravno, tvoje je pravo da se diviš nečijoj mongoloidnoj politici u najavi, a one koji od nje zaziru smatraš ludacima.




Oskare, imas dva nacina da pocnem da citam tvoja razglabanja, da promenis nick ili da obecas da neces pisati bas sve sto ti padne na pamet... ovako, bas me briga i sta pises i sta ti neko odogovara... ako te je neko uvredio, ja ga molim da to vise ne cini!!
oskar-z-wild oskar-z-wild 11:47 06.05.2014

Re: plaše ih ZLI DUSI, a ne RUSI

. ako te je neko uvredio, ja ga molim da to vise ne cini!!


Ma jok bre, nema uvrede. Samo proveravam da li si jo uvek tamo!
oskar-z-wild oskar-z-wild 11:54 06.05.2014

Re: plaše ih ZLI DUSI, a ne RUSI

predvidjao skoru propast Rusije


Zavisi šta smatraš pod "skorom". Ja govorim o višegodišnjem procesu. Veoma precizno. Ako ti se ne dopada, to je tvoj problem.
predatortz predatortz 11:57 06.05.2014

Re: plaše ih ZLI DUSI, a ne RUSI

oskar-z-wild
predvidjao skoru propast Rusije


Zavisi šta smatraš pod "skorom". Ja govorim o višegodišnjem procesu. Veoma precizno. Ako ti se ne dopada, to je tvoj problem.


Za to ne moraš biti neki prorok. Istorija ne poznaje 'zacementirana' stanja. Rusija će se , svakako, promeniti. Kao, uostalom, i sve druge imperije. Pa i sitnije države imaju period formiranja, uspona, zenita i pada.
apostata apostata 14:16 06.05.2014

Re: plaše ih ZLI DUSI, a ne RUSI

blogov_kolac
Država koja je većinu prošlog veka bila pojam za "imperiju zla", i nekoliko decenija predstavljala pravi pakao na zemlji za ogroman deo sopstvenog stanovništva, a gotovo isključivo donoseći nesreću svugde na planeti gde je mogla da uspostavi svoj iole snažniji i direktan uticaj - svoj jedini pravi istorijski pandan imala je u zloglasnom srednjevekovnom divljem mongolskom carstvu, koje je svojevremeno uspevalo u kontinuitetu da u dužem vremenskom periodu na ogromnom prostoru tada poznatog sveta zavija u crno takoreći sve čega se dotaklo, i svojom impresivnom vojnom snagom bilo u stanju da sebi pokori (ne zaboravimo da je Hitlerov Rajh, istorijski pojam za zlo koje neka država može da ostvari, vremenski trajao svega 10-ak godina, a da je Maova Kina bila izrazito samoizolovana zemlja, koja bez obzira na sav pakao koji je nosila u sebi nikada nije pokušavala agresivno da širi svoj usrećiteljski uticaj sa izuzetkom svoje baš najranije faze).

Za razliku od recimo Nemačke i Japana, koji su iz epizoda sopstvenog najvećeg istorijskog posrnuća (istina Nemci su to odradili tek u drugom pokušaju - prvi put su iz jednog zla na kraju prešli u nešto mnogo gore) izašli suočavanjem sa sopstvenom prošlošću, katarzom i politikom koja je trajna negacija one kojom su unesrećili bili pola sveta, sa Rusima to od početka njihovog "novog početka" to nikako nije bio slučaj. I prvo što su počeli njihovi vlastodršci da rade kada je država pukom srećom počela ekonomski da im staje na noge (zahvaljujući neviđenoj eksploziji cena energenata u XXI veku kojima su prebogati), bio je pokušaj revizije istorije pre svega sa akcentom na Staljinovu eru, a evo, sada najdirektnije pokušavaju na velika vrata da vrate politiku teritorijalne ekspanzije u odnosu na susede, a koja je vekovima funkcionisala u svetu sve dok se oružje nije toliko usavršilo da takvu politiku kao dominantnu čovečanstvo bukvalno biološki ne bi moglo da preživi, o čemu nam najbolje svedoče bilansi dva velika svetska rata iz prve polovine prošlog veka.

I sada se mi ovde u Srbiji iščuđavamo zašto pola sveta zazire zbog ovako snažnih znakova da bi neko opet da stvara nekakav novi CCCP na slično autoritarnim unutrašnjim osnovama, i da vrati na svetsku scenu definiciju rata kao "vođenje politike drugim sredstvima". Bolje da se priupitamo zašto smo mi jedina evropska zemlja kojoj je predsednik ruske Dume pohitao da se zahvali kako je njena javnost prihvatila i tumačila dosadašnja dešavanja u Ukrajini. Već četvrt veka smo ubeđeni da mi najbolje razumemo međunarodne (geo)političke procese, njihove uzroke i moguće posledice - a uvek se ispostavlja suprotno...

Ala!

Dugo ... al' stvarno dugo, nisam pročitao ovakav iracionalni izbljuvak.

Kapa dole majstore.
apostata apostata 14:21 06.05.2014

Re: plaše ih ZLI DUSI, a ne RUSI

blogov_kolac

Taj Sovjetski Savez, kada se urušio, i postale su dostupnije javnosti njegove najmračnije strane i tajne - ispostavilo se da je u svojim podrumima i ormanima zapravo imao i više kostura nego što je iko pretpostavljao... ali naravno, takvim istorijskim činjenicama smeju se (...)





Pa eboga ti, upravo je sve suprotno od onoga što su pričali i pisali Solženjicin, Konkvist&co.



Al' dobro ... hajd' ti samo nastavi i dalje gnojit'.
milojep milojep 14:42 06.05.2014

Re: plaše ih ZLI DUSI, a ne RUSI

A opasnost po Ruse je danas jako ozbiljna da kao u mnogim periodima trajanja Sovjetskog Saveza budu kao nekakvi "novi Mongoli" u odnosu na normalniji ostatak planete - spektakularno impresivna vojna sila koja se prostire na nepreglednim prostranstvima, a duboko trula iznutra i pakleno opasna spolja - ako po najgorem scenariju punom snagom nastave stazom koju je svet ignorisao u Gruziji, a sada u Ukrajini sagledava sa svim njenim mogućim posledicama, ako se na vreme ne obuzda.




Ne znam dal' si blogov ali kolac jesi!
alselone alselone 14:51 06.05.2014

Re: plaše ih ZLI DUSI, a ne RUSI

Ne znam dal' si blogov ali kolac jesi!

Blogov kolač, ne kolac. To mu tepamo zato što mu je trebalo 6 meseci da nauči da lupi enter posle pasusa. Ali zato zna da Rusija propada uskoro.
Domazet Domazet 22:50 07.05.2014

Kakav bre Oskar_Z_Wild!?

I sta kaze B_K, Japanci se suocili sa sopstvenom posrnulom prosloscu?? Koji neopevani zevzek. I O_Z_W mu dodje kao malo dete u poredjenju. Po ideoloskoj zaslepljenosti mu je jedino PredatorZ ravan...
Goran Vučković Goran Vučković 23:56 07.05.2014

Re: Kakav bre Oskar_Z_Wild!?

Domazet

Long time no see

Faktografska tačnost nije u modi, sad je u modi "zagovaranje".
oskar-z-wild oskar-z-wild 10:38 08.05.2014

Re: Kakav bre Oskar_Z_Wild!?

Bloger Vladimir-V-Putin rekao blogeru Anders-fog-Rasmusenu da je slep kod očiju kad ne vidi da ruske vojske nema.

Bon -- Nemački bloger Frank-Valter-Štajnmajer pozdravio "konstruktivan ton" blogera Vladimira-V-Putina, koji je pozvao proruske aktiviste da odloži referendum.

Kiev -- "Koji referendum?" pita bloger Arsenije-Bandera-Jacenjuk

Beč -- Austrijski bloger Hajnc-Gertner smatra mogućim da bi konflik oko Ukrajine mogao dovesti do "karikature Hladnog rata". Gertner smatra da Rusija, za razliku od ranijeg Sovjetskog saveza, nema gotovo saveznike osim blogera B92.
not2old2rock not2old2rock 11:48 08.05.2014

Re: Kakav bre Oskar_Z_Wild!?

oskar-z-wild
Gertner smatra da Rusija, za razliku od ranijeg Sovjetskog saveza, nema gotovo saveznike osim blogera B92.


Umesto kviska


charlie charlie 13:00 06.05.2014

Осредњи чланак овог Словенца !

Свеједно !
Успут - напред наши !
predatortz predatortz 13:05 06.05.2014

Re: Осредњи чланак овог Словенца !

charlie
Свеједно !
Успут - напред наши !


Koji naši?
Ovi što su nas bombardovali '99. , ili ovi što su nam instalirali komuniste '45. ?
vera.nolan2 vera.nolan2 12:25 08.05.2014

Re:

Koji naši?
Ovi što su nas bombardovali '99. , ili ovi što su nam instalirali komuniste '45. ?

pa to su ti isti! Nije li Cercil,rekao sinu Randolfu, kad se vratio iz izvidnice 43ce iz Yu,sokiran:"Pa vi pravite tamo socijalizam?!-Sta te briga,neces ti tamo ziveti!"
Sve ti je to isto,Jalta ,Malta i tako sl. Sedne elita pa se dogovori,koga i kad ce da miksa...Savez svetskih interesnih elita...Ma,predatori,bre...
predatortz predatortz 12:36 08.05.2014

Re: Re:


pa to su ti isti! Nije li Cercil,rekao sinu Randolfu, kad se vratio iz izvidnice 43ce iz Yu,sokiran:"Pa vi pravite tamo socijalizam?!-Sta te briga,neces ti tamo ziveti!"
Sve ti je to isto,Jalta ,Malta i tako sl. Sedne elita pa se dogovori,koga i kad ce da miksa...Savez svetskih interesnih elita..


To i hdedoh da kažem. Imajući u vidu naš položaj i mogućnosti, najpametnije što možemo da uradmo je da se ne mešamo i ne svrstavamo dokle god je to moguće. Pustimo velike neka završe svoje igre... Drage rusofile bih potsedio na rezolucije koje je Rusija izglasavala devedesetih u SB, na priznavanje Hrvatske, Bosne... U novijoj istoriji nas nisu bog zna čim dobrim zadužili. Glupo bi bilo da najebemo zbog njih. S druge strane, ne treba trčati na rukoljub Zapadu. Njima naša pomoć, sem da nas po hiljaditi put ponize, ni zbog čega nije potrebna.

Ma,predatori,bre...


Stoka je to neopevana.
noboole noboole 14:03 09.05.2014

.

Opste je poznato da su Rusi u stvari Šivanci, insektolika rasa vanzemaljaca kojima je cilj da sprece intergalakticku ekspanziju homo sapiensa. Oni su samo prethodnica i monitori. Srecom, Amerika je prepuna iskopina koje su za sobom ostavili the Ancients u kojima je mozda i kljuc toga kako se suprotstaviti krvozednim vanzemaljcima.
oskar-z-wild oskar-z-wild 17:26 09.05.2014

Rotšild & Gazprom

Gazprom beats Apple to top global ranking amid Rothschild interest
May 6, 2014 Anna Kuchma, RBTH
Gazprom has become the world's biggest public company in terms of EBITDA, leaving Apple and ExxonMobil behind. In a separate development, the Rothschild Investment Corporation has been reported to be actively buying Gazprom shares.
Source: Russia Beyond the Headlines - http://rbth.co.uk/business/2014/05/06/gazprom_beats_apple_to_top_global_ranking_amid_rothschild_interest_36441.html?code=c8ee1d1ac55d6c1d5eb3219a42787034)


oskar-z-wild oskar-z-wild 17:43 09.05.2014

Thank God for Free Press

MAY 9, 2014
“V” FOR VLADIMIR
POSTED BY JOSHUA YAFFA
The New Yorker

May 9th, when Russians celebrate the Soviet Union’s victory over Nazi Germany, is the country’s only true national holiday—a day to remember the collective suffering and achievement of the Second World War, which is the closest thing that post-Soviet Russia has to a foundational unifying story. The wartime losses were enormous, with more than twenty million dead, and each Russian family was touched, in some way, by the conflict. The memory of the Second World War may have passed into the realm of history in Europe and in the United States, but in Russia it remains very much alive, part of the country’s everyday consciousness. For that reason, the annual celebration of Victory Day is unavoidably political: the defeat of Fascism, nearly seventy years ago, provides an unassailable justification for whatever the Russian state does today.

This year’s festivities will to be especially resonant. Vladimir Putin plans to visit Sevastopol, a port city on the Crimean peninsula that was the site of a decisive battle in the Second World War. Earlier this year, when Russian troops and pro-Russian militias seized control of Crimea, they claimed to be protecting the territory from Fascists, drawing a straight line from the villains of the Second World War to the new government in Kiev. Putin’s Victory Day visit is meant to underline the historical connection. In his narrative—which has been widely embraced in Russia—the justice of Crimea’s return to Russia is intimately connected to the wartime heroism displayed there seven decades earlier.

For many years, May 9th was celebrated with equal fervor in Ukraine and in Russia, but that unifying spirit will certainly be lacking this year. There will likely be clashes across south and east Ukraine, with pro-Russian and pro-Maidan forces battling to claim the legacy of the Second World War and the legitimacy that comes with the inheritance of the victory over Fascism. Many old grievances—such as the fact that some western Ukrainians supported the Nazis—will be aired once again during the Victory Day celebrations.

The government in Kiev has already announced that they will replace the traditional avatar of wartime remembrance in Russia, the orange-and-black Saint George’s Ribbon, with a red-and-black poppy, like those associated with Remembrance Day in Western Europe. Sergei Shoigu, the Russian Defense Minister, seized the opportunity, announcing the details of the annual military parade on Red Square, to declare “The most important political significance” of the holiday. “We must again demonstrate to the world Russia’s categorical rejection of Fascism,” he said.

The first victory parade was held in June, 1945, just weeks after Soviet troops captured Berlin. Soldiers representing every front in the war marched across Red Square, led by Marshal Georgy Zhukov, who rode a white horse. Joseph Stalin watched the proceedings from atop Lenin’s mausoleum. The next year, however, Stalin downgraded May 9th to a regular work day, with no celebrations or parades. This was, in part, because he was wary of the threat of returned military heroes—he knew the history of the Decembrists, the Tsarist officers who fought in the Napoleonic Wars and launched a failed revolution after coming home. But perhaps even more important was the fact that much of the country was still in ruins, and its people were in no mood to celebrate the war.

It wasn’t until the twentieth anniversary of the Soviet victory, in 1965, that Leonid Brezhnev reinstated May 9th as a state holiday, replete with a military parade across Red Square. His immediate aims were to solidify his own rule atop the Politburo—he had risen to the post of general secretary in 1964—and to move Soviet society away from the “thaw,” a period of relative openness under his predecessor, Nikita Khrushchev. According to Lev Gudkov, a sociologist and the director of the Levada Center, a polling and research organization in Moscow, Brezhnev introduced a “pompous and ceremonial” official history of the war, as an “affirmation of nationalist values,” in which the state was all powerful and victory was “presented as the realization of a single plan of the Communist Party.”

By bringing the commemoration of victory, and the memory of the war, under the authority of the state, the Soviet leadership could reassert its control over how that history would be told. Under Khrushchev, a genre of war literature known as “lieutenants’ prose”—written by authors who had been mid-level soldiers—had flourished, offering a ground-level view of battle that could be ugly and raw. Writers like Viktor Nekrasov and Emmanuil Kazakevich depicted the war as a private experience, full of violence and misery, and they did not always portray top Soviet military officials in a favorable light. Brezhnev sought to recapture the wartime experience for the state, with histories in which generals and Party leaders wisely stewarded the country through crises. Around this time, the first memoirs of top wartime figures, including Zhukov, were released, and films emphasized Soviet bravery while downplaying the horror and the suffering of the German invasion.

By the mid-nineteen-sixties, the Soviet state was no longer promising its citizens a utopian Communist future. Under Brezhnev, the state “stopped working on a vision of the future and, instead, focussed on the past,” the cultural historian Boris Dubin told me. The memory of the war, with Victory Day as its triumphant and unchanging centerpiece, became the basis for an official mythology that heralded a new type of “Soviet man.” This collective identity—and the bond between the state and its loyal subjects—was grounded in the story of shared victory. Unlike in previous generations, Dubin said, the state “didn’t demand heroic feats from its citizens; it didn’t require their mobilization.” Instead the system demanded only “adaptation to their current circumstances—this is how it will be forever.” Victory Day would therefore serve as a yearly reminder of the timelessness and incontestable virtue of the Soviet system.

As time passed, and lived memories of the war became more rare, May 9th became less a celebration of those who fought and more a hymn to the power and greatness of the Soviet Union. During a time of cynicism about Communist ideology, when there was little passion for Marxist-Leninist philosophy, the state increasingly justified its authority and its merit by referencing the victory over Nazism. For Russians, then, as now, the defeat of Hitler’s army, and the astonishing human cost that it entailed, represented “a spiritual achievement,” said Vladimir Afanasev, a senior historian at the Central Armed Forces Museum, in Moscow. It is not exactly religious, but there is something almost holy, and certainly quite solemn, in the way the country marks Victory Day. For Russians, Afanasev said, the horrors of the war were “like the suffering of Christ: you had an entire people go through a colossal test, a colossal suffering.”

The appeal of Victory Day for Putin, who has lamented the country’s “dire lack of spiritual ties,” is obvious. Like his predecessors in the Kremlin, Putin understands that the unifying experience of the war is one of the nation’s few uncontested achievements. (Another such achievement, the exploration of space, is far less symbolic and powerful.) Under Putin, the military parade on May 9th has become a stylized and well-produced affair, overseen by Konstantin Ernst, the director of Russia’s largest state-controlled television network, Channel One. Putin’s version of Victory Day, Dubin has written, combines “the symbols of a great power and Orthodoxy” with “the techniques of Hollywood poetics and pyrotechnics.”

As the celebration of May 9th has become more grandiose, the freedom to discuss the history of the war has been more tightly restricted. The memory of the war is too important—and too powerful—to be left uncontrolled. Earlier this week, Putin signed a new law that criminalizes “rehabilitation of Nazism,” which includes spreading “false information” about the conduct of Soviet forces during the war, thereby squelching any conversation about atrocities committed by the Red Army during its march across Europe.

Though Putin has relied on the historical memory of the war to underlie the state’s power, and, by extension, his own, the triumph was never his. With Russia’s annexation of Crimea, however, Putin has a victory that belongs to him. He no longer has to lean on the memory of a heroic achievement from decades ago—now there is a new success to match the old, and, better yet, they are inexorably linked, two points on the same chain of historical destiny. The Russian people, at least for now, appear to be grateful: Putin’s approval rating is above eighty per cent, and just three per cent say that they disapprove of Crimea joining Russia. In contrast to the sanctified suffering of Second World War, the retaking of Crimea required no sacrifice from the Russian people. But eastern Ukraine is sinking into violence and chaos, and Putin may find it a far more difficult situation to control. He will surely enjoy his victory celebration in Sevastopol, but, as the costs of his westward adventure mount, the history of May 9th should be a reminder that future triumphs will not come so easily.

Update:

On Friday morning, Putin presided over the Victory Day military parade through Red Square, which included divisions from Crimea. “This is the holiday when the invincible power of patriotism triumphs,” Putin said, in a brief speech before the parade. “When all of us particularly feel what it means to be faithful to the Motherland and how important it is to defend its interests.”

After the ceremony in Moscow, Putin flew directly to Sevastopol—his first visit to Crimea since Russia claimed the territory. In Donetsk, in eastern Ukraine, pro-Russian separatists paid tribute to Stalin and likened the Soviet fight against fascism to their struggle against the new government in Kiev. And in the southeastern coastal city of Mariupol, where separatists have occupied a police headquarters that government troops attempted to retake, fighting on Friday left at least eight dead.
freehand freehand 18:26 09.05.2014

Re: Thank God for Free Press

May 9th, when Russians celebrate the Soviet Union’s victory over Nazi Germany, is the country’s only true national holiday

To je dan koji svi antifašisti na svetu slave kao dan pobede nad fašizmom.
Ne samo Sovjetski savez nekad i ne samo Rusija danas.
Nebojša Milikić Nebojša Milikić 08:37 10.05.2014

Re: Thank God for Free Press

oskar-z-wild
MAY 9, 2014
“V” FOR VLADIMIR
POSTED BY JOSHUA YAFFA
The New Yorker

May 9th, when Russians celebrate the Soviet Union’s victory over Nazi Germany, is the country’s only true national holiday—a day to remember the collective suffering and achievement of the Second World War, which is the closest thing that post-Soviet Russia has to a foundational unifying story. The wartime losses were enormous, with more than twenty million dead, and each Russian family was touched, in some way, by the conflict. The memory of the Second World War may have passed into the realm of history in Europe and in the United States, but in Russia it remains very much alive, part of the country’s everyday consciousness. For that reason, the annual celebration of Victory Day is unavoidably political: the defeat of Fascism, nearly seventy years ago, provides an unassailable justification for whatever the Russian state does today.

This year’s festivities will to be especially resonant. Vladimir Putin plans to visit Sevastopol, a port city on the Crimean peninsula that was the site of a decisive battle in the Second World War. Earlier this year, when Russian troops and pro-Russian militias seized control of Crimea, they claimed to be protecting the territory from Fascists, drawing a straight line from the villains of the Second World War to the new government in Kiev. Putin’s Victory Day visit is meant to underline the historical connection. In his narrative—which has been widely embraced in Russia—the justice of Crimea’s return to Russia is intimately connected to the wartime heroism displayed there seven decades earlier.

For many years, May 9th was celebrated with equal fervor in Ukraine and in Russia, but that unifying spirit will certainly be lacking this year. There will likely be clashes across south and east Ukraine, with pro-Russian and pro-Maidan forces battling to claim the legacy of the Second World War and the legitimacy that comes with the inheritance of the victory over Fascism. Many old grievances—such as the fact that some western Ukrainians supported the Nazis—will be aired once again during the Victory Day celebrations.

The government in Kiev has already announced that they will replace the traditional avatar of wartime remembrance in Russia, the orange-and-black Saint George’s Ribbon, with a red-and-black poppy, like those associated with Remembrance Day in Western Europe. Sergei Shoigu, the Russian Defense Minister, seized the opportunity, announcing the details of the annual military parade on Red Square, to declare “The most important political significance” of the holiday. “We must again demonstrate to the world Russia’s categorical rejection of Fascism,” he said.

The first victory parade was held in June, 1945, just weeks after Soviet troops captured Berlin. Soldiers representing every front in the war marched across Red Square, led by Marshal Georgy Zhukov, who rode a white horse. Joseph Stalin watched the proceedings from atop Lenin’s mausoleum. The next year, however, Stalin downgraded May 9th to a regular work day, with no celebrations or parades. This was, in part, because he was wary of the threat of returned military heroes—he knew the history of the Decembrists, the Tsarist officers who fought in the Napoleonic Wars and launched a failed revolution after coming home. But perhaps even more important was the fact that much of the country was still in ruins, and its people were in no mood to celebrate the war.

It wasn’t until the twentieth anniversary of the Soviet victory, in 1965, that Leonid Brezhnev reinstated May 9th as a state holiday, replete with a military parade across Red Square. His immediate aims were to solidify his own rule atop the Politburo—he had risen to the post of general secretary in 1964—and to move Soviet society away from the “thaw,” a period of relative openness under his predecessor, Nikita Khrushchev. According to Lev Gudkov, a sociologist and the director of the Levada Center, a polling and research organization in Moscow, Brezhnev introduced a “pompous and ceremonial” official history of the war, as an “affirmation of nationalist values,” in which the state was all powerful and victory was “presented as the realization of a single plan of the Communist Party.”

By bringing the commemoration of victory, and the memory of the war, under the authority of the state, the Soviet leadership could reassert its control over how that history would be told. Under Khrushchev, a genre of war literature known as “lieutenants’ prose”—written by authors who had been mid-level soldiers—had flourished, offering a ground-level view of battle that could be ugly and raw. Writers like Viktor Nekrasov and Emmanuil Kazakevich depicted the war as a private experience, full of violence and misery, and they did not always portray top Soviet military officials in a favorable light. Brezhnev sought to recapture the wartime experience for the state, with histories in which generals and Party leaders wisely stewarded the country through crises. Around this time, the first memoirs of top wartime figures, including Zhukov, were released, and films emphasized Soviet bravery while downplaying the horror and the suffering of the German invasion.

By the mid-nineteen-sixties, the Soviet state was no longer promising its citizens a utopian Communist future. Under Brezhnev, the state “stopped working on a vision of the future and, instead, focussed on the past,” the cultural historian Boris Dubin told me. The memory of the war, with Victory Day as its triumphant and unchanging centerpiece, became the basis for an official mythology that heralded a new type of “Soviet man.” This collective identity—and the bond between the state and its loyal subjects—was grounded in the story of shared victory. Unlike in previous generations, Dubin said, the state “didn’t demand heroic feats from its citizens; it didn’t require their mobilization.” Instead the system demanded only “adaptation to their current circumstances—this is how it will be forever.” Victory Day would therefore serve as a yearly reminder of the timelessness and incontestable virtue of the Soviet system.

As time passed, and lived memories of the war became more rare, May 9th became less a celebration of those who fought and more a hymn to the power and greatness of the Soviet Union. During a time of cynicism about Communist ideology, when there was little passion for Marxist-Leninist philosophy, the state increasingly justified its authority and its merit by referencing the victory over Nazism. For Russians, then, as now, the defeat of Hitler’s army, and the astonishing human cost that it entailed, represented “a spiritual achievement,” said Vladimir Afanasev, a senior historian at the Central Armed Forces Museum, in Moscow. It is not exactly religious, but there is something almost holy, and certainly quite solemn, in the way the country marks Victory Day. For Russians, Afanasev said, the horrors of the war were “like the suffering of Christ: you had an entire people go through a colossal test, a colossal suffering.”

The appeal of Victory Day for Putin, who has lamented the country’s “dire lack of spiritual ties,” is obvious. Like his predecessors in the Kremlin, Putin understands that the unifying experience of the war is one of the nation’s few uncontested achievements. (Another such achievement, the exploration of space, is far less symbolic and powerful.) Under Putin, the military parade on May 9th has become a stylized and well-produced affair, overseen by Konstantin Ernst, the director of Russia’s largest state-controlled television network, Channel One. Putin’s version of Victory Day, Dubin has written, combines “the symbols of a great power and Orthodoxy” with “the techniques of Hollywood poetics and pyrotechnics.”

As the celebration of May 9th has become more grandiose, the freedom to discuss the history of the war has been more tightly restricted. The memory of the war is too important—and too powerful—to be left uncontrolled. Earlier this week, Putin signed a new law that criminalizes “rehabilitation of Nazism,” which includes spreading “false information” about the conduct of Soviet forces during the war, thereby squelching any conversation about atrocities committed by the Red Army during its march across Europe.

Though Putin has relied on the historical memory of the war to underlie the state’s power, and, by extension, his own, the triumph was never his. With Russia’s annexation of Crimea, however, Putin has a victory that belongs to him. He no longer has to lean on the memory of a heroic achievement from decades ago—now there is a new success to match the old, and, better yet, they are inexorably linked, two points on the same chain of historical destiny. The Russian people, at least for now, appear to be grateful: Putin’s approval rating is above eighty per cent, and just three per cent say that they disapprove of Crimea joining Russia. In contrast to the sanctified suffering of Second World War, the retaking of Crimea required no sacrifice from the Russian people. But eastern Ukraine is sinking into violence and chaos, and Putin may find it a far more difficult situation to control. He will surely enjoy his victory celebration in Sevastopol, but, as the costs of his westward adventure mount, the history of May 9th should be a reminder that future triumphs will not come so easily.

Update:

On Friday morning, Putin presided over the Victory Day military parade through Red Square, which included divisions from Crimea. “This is the holiday when the invincible power of patriotism triumphs,” Putin said, in a brief speech before the parade. “When all of us particularly feel what it means to be faithful to the Motherland and how important it is to defend its interests.”

After the ceremony in Moscow, Putin flew directly to Sevastopol—his first visit to Crimea since Russia claimed the territory. In Donetsk, in eastern Ukraine, pro-Russian separatists paid tribute to Stalin and likened the Soviet fight against fascism to their struggle against the new government in Kiev. And in the southeastern coastal city of Mariupol, where separatists have occupied a police headquarters that government troops attempted to retake, fighting on Friday left at least eight dead.


sve poprilicno tacno, ali napisano od strane ili vrlo povrsnog poznavaoca problematike ili nekog ko lagano podleze cenzuri ili autocenzuri... osim sto se ignorise cinjenica da je WW2 u Rusiji i uopste ne istoku Evrope (za razliku od onog na zapadu Evrope) bio rat do istrebljenja ili makar do porobljavanja i anihilacije svake nacionalne samostalnosti i samobitnosti, precutkuje se da je politika secanja na WW2 u celoj Evropi dozivela neki oblik revival-a i reinterpretacije sredinom sezdesetih, tako da SSSR tu i nije neki izuzetak... tada su prakticno pocele i prve ozbiljne studije onoga sto se zaista desavalo i razvila se neka opsta svest o obimu i prirodi nacistickih zlocina ali i citava strategija njihove relativizacije i zataskavanja... nadalje, u to vreme postalo je i jasno i javno i da je najveci deo prezivelog nacistickog aparata manje-vise bezbolno integrisan u NATO ili politicke strukture Zap. Nemacke i da igra vrlo vaznu ulogu u hladnom ratu... itd. itd... dakle, ovo je sve osim sadrzaja necega sto bi mogli smatrati slobodnom stampom, osim ako ovako ocigledno filtriranje informacija i stelovanje pristupa ne razumemo kao ekonomski motivisano dodvoravanje ionako indoktriniranom citalastvu... makar da je pomenuto da je takva vrsta upotrebe traumaticne istorije u svrhu izgradnje nacionalnog jedinstva opste poznata i opste rasprostranjena pojava, npr. http://www.slate.com/articles/arts/culturebox/2011/06/thanks_a_lot_ken_burns.html
freehand freehand 08:43 10.05.2014

Re: Thank God for Free Press

sve poprilicno tacno, ali napisano od strane ili vrlo povrsnog poznavaoca problematike ili nekog ko lagano podleze cenzuri ili autocenzuri... osim sto se ignorise cinjenica da je WW2 u Rusiji i uopste ne istoku Evrope (za razliku od onog na zapadu Evrope) bio rat do istrebljenja ili makar do porobljavanja i anihilacije svake nacionalne samostalnosti i samobitnosti, precutkuje se da je politika secanja na WW2 u celoj Evropi dozivela neki oblik revival-a i reinterpretacije sredinom sezdesetih, tako da SSSR tu i nije neki izuzetak... tada su prakticno pocele i prve ozbiljne studije onoga sto se zaista desavalo i razvila se neka opsta svest o obimu i prirodi nacistickih zlocina ali i citava strategija njihove relativizacije i zataskavanja... nadalje, u to vreme postalo je i jasno i javno i da je najveci deo prezivelog nacistickog aparata manje-vise bezbolno integrisan u NATO ili politicke strukture Zap. Nemacke i da igra vrlo vaznu ulogu u hladnom ratu... itd. itd... dakle, ovo je sve osim sadrzaja necega sto bi mogli smatrati slobodnom stampom, osim ako ovako ocigledno filtriranje informacija i stelovanje pristupa ne razumemo kao ekonomski motivisano dodvoravanje ionako indoktriniranom citalastvu... makar da je pomenuto da je takva vrsta upotrebe traumaticne istorije u svrhu izgradnje nacionalnog jedinstva opste poznata i opste rasprostranjena pojava, npr. http://www.slate.com/articles/arts/culturebox/2011/06/thanks_a_lot_ken_burns.html

Sve te je razumeo i sad sa razumevanjem zamišljen klima glavom.
omega68 omega68 12:33 10.05.2014

Re: Thank God for Free Press

da je najveci deo prezivelog nacistickog aparata manje-vise bezbolno integrisan u NATO ili politicke strukture

oskar-z-wild oskar-z-wild 20:12 11.05.2014

Re: Thank God for Free Press

ovo je sve osim sadrzaja necega sto bi mogli smatrati slobodnom stampom, osim ako ovako ocigledno filtriranje informacija i stelovanje pristupa ne razumemo kao ekonomski motivisano dodvoravanje ionako indoktriniranom citalastvu...


A touch a paranoia perhaps?
freehand freehand 20:18 11.05.2014

Re: Thank God for Free Press

oskar-z-wild
ovo je sve osim sadrzaja necega sto bi mogli smatrati slobodnom stampom, osim ako ovako ocigledno filtriranje informacija i stelovanje pristupa ne razumemo kao ekonomski motivisano dodvoravanje ionako indoktriniranom citalastvu...


A touch a paranoia perhaps?


oskar-z-wild oskar-z-wild 17:55 09.05.2014

Happy happy happy

Vladimir Putin could drive an army through the gaps in Britain's defences
Crisis in Ukraine shows why David Cameron cannot afford to run down our military capability
By Fraser Nelson6:30AM BST 09 May 2014
The Daily Telegraph


From the moment he became Foreign Secretary, William Hague embarked on a very specific mission. He was, he said, out to stop any “strategic shrinkage” – in other words, to make sure that Britain’s standing on the world stage would not be diminished because there were cuts going on at home. The Conservatives did not endure 13 years in Opposition, he declares now and again, only to resume the management of British decline.

But the stature of nations tends to be decided by actions rather than words, and Britain’s have told a rather different story. We occupied Basra, only to be forced out by Iranian-backed militias. We then set up an inquiry to ask why we fought, rather than why we lost. We’re about to abandon Afghanistan to the Taliban. We performed a drive-by shooting in Libya, rightly helping to depose a dictator but failing to follow up by offering proper support to the new regime. Our Prime Minister wanted to intervene in Syria, but presented a case so weak that our own Parliament voted it down. To the outside world, Britain looks like it is shrinking fairly quickly – along with other indebted, war-weary Western powers. Our commitment looks shaky, our judgment even worse.

And this, of course, is what has fuelled the Ukraine crisis. Vladimir Putin saw how things were changing, and decided to give the Caucasus a prod; then to see what would happen if he annexed Crimea. The answer, as he suspected, was not very much. Now, his unbadged militants are at work in the east of Ukraine with dozens dead. Still no reaction. This sent out a clear message to Moscow and beyond: the West has grown tired of policing the world. And now, as a century ago, things are up for grabs.

David Cameron is no isolationist. He instinctively believes that Britain should be a force for good in the world, and has been remarkably quick to deploy the military. This week, he has made British special forces available to help recover schoolgirls kidnapped by Islamist militants in Nigeria. Last year, he declared that he would “close down ungoverned spaces” in the Sahara to deny such groups a safe haven. To his great credit, he overruled his own generals when deciding to stop a potential genocide in Benghazi.

But when asked in the Commons this week if he would keep defence spending at the minimum for Nato members – two per cent of national income – he dodged the question. And here is the problem: a large gap has emerged between what Nato leaders say they want, and what they’re willing to pay for – a gap so large that Putin thinks he can drive an army through it. Germany is too dependent on cheap Russian gas. France is too dependent on lucrative Russian defence contracts. And the rest of Nato just doesn’t want to know. The Poles, Czechs and Estonians are beginning to realise that membership of this alliance may not protect them after all.

Much was made of the RAF sending four jets to Lithuania – but we have been doing this on and off for 10 years, as part of a deal to guard the Baltic states’ airspace. Overall, there has been a depressingly slow Nato response, even while its old enemy springs back to life.

It doesn’t take a Sovietologist to decrypt Putin’s game plan: he made his intentions clear in a cogent speech to Russia’s parliament a few weeks ago. The Kremlin took the trouble of translating it into English, in case there were any misunderstandings. The break-up of the Soviet Union was a tragedy, Putin said, but Russia was – back then – too weak to defend the “plundered” territory. No longer.

John Kerry has rightly said that the deepening crisis in the Ukraine is a wake-up call for Nato. But it should also be a wake-up call for our own government – which has been hitting the “sleep” button for too long. Mr Cameron’s decision to shrink the military was justified by a National Security Strategy so rosy in outlook that it didn’t even mention Russia. The foreign aid budget was to rise by as much as the Ministry of Defence budget was to fall – so not a money-saving exercise, but a deliberate shift in priorities. It was a bet on a quieter world.

Liam Fox, who oversaw the military cuts as defence secretary, now says the West was deluding itself about the Russian menace. He gave a speech in Tallinn on Wednesday, explaining how the desire to see Russia as an emerging democracy had allowed “wishful thinking to take the place of critical analysis”. Especially given that Putin has not surprised the West with new tactics, but is simply continuing his declared strategy of returning his country to greatness (as tested in Georgia five years ago). The Russian president, said Dr Fox, is still observing “weak Western leadership”, and may come for Bosnia next.

That Putin feels able to close in on eastern Ukraine does not signal his strength, but our failure to deter him. We have fretted so much about the nuclear deterrent – our Trident missiles – that we have lost sight of the conventional method. This involves fairly basic things, like having more soldiers than we did at the turn of the 18th century. It means winning the conflicts that we choose to engage in. And it should mean that, if Nato cannot get its act together, we should send our own troops on exercises in Eastern Europe to reassure our allies.

In Wales in September, David Cameron is to host a Nato summit; he has dedicated the meeting to seeing if it can remain “a relevant, modern, adaptable force fit for the 21st century”. It’s rather wishful thinking. Most Nato members have used the alliance as an excuse to cut military spending, and spent the Cold War sheltering under an American nuclear umbrella. Britain and America are now joined only by Estonia and Greece in meeting the spending target. While we have skimped, the Russians have invested – to the extent that the era of our air dominance is over. Senior British military figures now believe that any Nato aircraft flown over Syria or Iran faces a horribly high chance of being shot down by Russian technology.

Even Britain may soon drop out of the basic defence spending club. The reason that the Prime Minister was so coy in the Commons this week is that, if you strip out Afghanistan, we’ll soon fall below the minimum that we’re asking others to spend. And when the bill for renewing Trident comes in, towards the end of the decade, the real squeeze on the rest of the military will become worse than ever. This may make for an awkward Nato conference in Newport: can we really lecture our allies for failing to invest in defence, when we’re sacking soldiers and running aircraft carriers without any aircraft?

This takes us back to the question the Prime Minister elegantly dodged this week. The Conservatives have promised to spend 0.7 per cent of national income on foreign aid, and demonstrated that they can keep this promise in spite of its great unpopularity. So there is nothing to stop the next Tory manifesto promising to keep military spending at this Nato minimum of 2 per cent of national output, especially if we wish to avoid more “strategic shrinkage”. It is, simply put, an issue of priorities – but is defence still a priority for the modern Conservative Party? This is a question that only David Cameron can answer.

Fraser Nelson is editor of 'The Spectator’
Nebojša Milikić Nebojša Milikić 16:41 10.05.2014

Re: Happy happy happy

oskar-z-wild
Vladimir Putin could drive an army through the gaps in Britain's defences
Crisis in Ukraine shows why David Cameron cannot afford to run down our military capability
By Fraser Nelson6:30AM BST 09 May 2014
The Daily Telegraph


From the moment he became Foreign Secretary, William Hague embarked on a very specific mission. He was, he said, out to stop any “strategic shrinkage” – in other words, to make sure that Britain’s standing on the world stage would not be diminished because there were cuts going on at home. The Conservatives did not endure 13 years in Opposition, he declares now and again, only to resume the management of British decline.

But the stature of nations tends to be decided by actions rather than words, and Britain’s have told a rather different story. We occupied Basra, only to be forced out by Iranian-backed militias. We then set up an inquiry to ask why we fought, rather than why we lost. We’re about to abandon Afghanistan to the Taliban. We performed a drive-by shooting in Libya, rightly helping to depose a dictator but failing to follow up by offering proper support to the new regime. Our Prime Minister wanted to intervene in Syria, but presented a case so weak that our own Parliament voted it down. To the outside world, Britain looks like it is shrinking fairly quickly – along with other indebted, war-weary Western powers. Our commitment looks shaky, our judgment even worse.

And this, of course, is what has fuelled the Ukraine crisis. Vladimir Putin saw how things were changing, and decided to give the Caucasus a prod; then to see what would happen if he annexed Crimea. The answer, as he suspected, was not very much. Now, his unbadged militants are at work in the east of Ukraine with dozens dead. Still no reaction. This sent out a clear message to Moscow and beyond: the West has grown tired of policing the world. And now, as a century ago, things are up for grabs.

David Cameron is no isolationist. He instinctively believes that Britain should be a force for good in the world, and has been remarkably quick to deploy the military. This week, he has made British special forces available to help recover schoolgirls kidnapped by Islamist militants in Nigeria. Last year, he declared that he would “close down ungoverned spaces” in the Sahara to deny such groups a safe haven. To his great credit, he overruled his own generals when deciding to stop a potential genocide in Benghazi.

But when asked in the Commons this week if he would keep defence spending at the minimum for Nato members – two per cent of national income – he dodged the question. And here is the problem: a large gap has emerged between what Nato leaders say they want, and what they’re willing to pay for – a gap so large that Putin thinks he can drive an army through it. Germany is too dependent on cheap Russian gas. France is too dependent on lucrative Russian defence contracts. And the rest of Nato just doesn’t want to know. The Poles, Czechs and Estonians are beginning to realise that membership of this alliance may not protect them after all.

Much was made of the RAF sending four jets to Lithuania – but we have been doing this on and off for 10 years, as part of a deal to guard the Baltic states’ airspace. Overall, there has been a depressingly slow Nato response, even while its old enemy springs back to life.

It doesn’t take a Sovietologist to decrypt Putin’s game plan: he made his intentions clear in a cogent speech to Russia’s parliament a few weeks ago. The Kremlin took the trouble of translating it into English, in case there were any misunderstandings. The break-up of the Soviet Union was a tragedy, Putin said, but Russia was – back then – too weak to defend the “plundered” territory. No longer.

John Kerry has rightly said that the deepening crisis in the Ukraine is a wake-up call for Nato. But it should also be a wake-up call for our own government – which has been hitting the “sleep” button for too long. Mr Cameron’s decision to shrink the military was justified by a National Security Strategy so rosy in outlook that it didn’t even mention Russia. The foreign aid budget was to rise by as much as the Ministry of Defence budget was to fall – so not a money-saving exercise, but a deliberate shift in priorities. It was a bet on a quieter world.

Liam Fox, who oversaw the military cuts as defence secretary, now says the West was deluding itself about the Russian menace. He gave a speech in Tallinn on Wednesday, explaining how the desire to see Russia as an emerging democracy had allowed “wishful thinking to take the place of critical analysis”. Especially given that Putin has not surprised the West with new tactics, but is simply continuing his declared strategy of returning his country to greatness (as tested in Georgia five years ago). The Russian president, said Dr Fox, is still observing “weak Western leadership”, and may come for Bosnia next.

That Putin feels able to close in on eastern Ukraine does not signal his strength, but our failure to deter him. We have fretted so much about the nuclear deterrent – our Trident missiles – that we have lost sight of the conventional method. This involves fairly basic things, like having more soldiers than we did at the turn of the 18th century. It means winning the conflicts that we choose to engage in. And it should mean that, if Nato cannot get its act together, we should send our own troops on exercises in Eastern Europe to reassure our allies.

In Wales in September, David Cameron is to host a Nato summit; he has dedicated the meeting to seeing if it can remain “a relevant, modern, adaptable force fit for the 21st century”. It’s rather wishful thinking. Most Nato members have used the alliance as an excuse to cut military spending, and spent the Cold War sheltering under an American nuclear umbrella. Britain and America are now joined only by Estonia and Greece in meeting the spending target. While we have skimped, the Russians have invested – to the extent that the era of our air dominance is over. Senior British military figures now believe that any Nato aircraft flown over Syria or Iran faces a horribly high chance of being shot down by Russian technology.

Even Britain may soon drop out of the basic defence spending club. The reason that the Prime Minister was so coy in the Commons this week is that, if you strip out Afghanistan, we’ll soon fall below the minimum that we’re asking others to spend. And when the bill for renewing Trident comes in, towards the end of the decade, the real squeeze on the rest of the military will become worse than ever. This may make for an awkward Nato conference in Newport: can we really lecture our allies for failing to invest in defence, when we’re sacking soldiers and running aircraft carriers without any aircraft?

This takes us back to the question the Prime Minister elegantly dodged this week. The Conservatives have promised to spend 0.7 per cent of national income on foreign aid, and demonstrated that they can keep this promise in spite of its great unpopularity. So there is nothing to stop the next Tory manifesto promising to keep military spending at this Nato minimum of 2 per cent of national output, especially if we wish to avoid more “strategic shrinkage”. It is, simply put, an issue of priorities – but is defence still a priority for the modern Conservative Party? This is a question that only David Cameron can answer.

Fraser Nelson is editor of 'The Spectator’


Lukrativni sarmantni idiotizam karakteristican za polupismene ratne huskace... (ne odnosi se na tebe Oskare vec na autora clanka, generala Nelsona)

oskar-z-wild oskar-z-wild 20:07 11.05.2014

Re: Happy happy happy

Lukrativni sarmantni idiotizam karakteristican za polupismene ratne huskace...


Perhaps brushing up your language skills will do the job.
oskar-z-wild oskar-z-wild 18:17 09.05.2014

Dugorocna strategija

oskar-z-wild oskar-z-wild 18:46 09.05.2014

Opinions

Vladi­mir Putin’s new world order with the West

By Lilia Shevtsova, Published: May 8
Lilia Shevtsova is a senior associate at the Carnegie Moscow Center and author of “Putin’s Russia.”

The post-Cold War order that emerged from the breakup of the Soviet Union was doomed to fail because it rested on a belief that post-Soviet Russia was no longer a problem. Even when Western leaders realized that Russia under Vladimir Putin was becoming a problem, they exchanged political acquiescence with the Kremlin for economic benefits. Liberal democracies agreed to play a game of “let’s pretend,” in which they viewed Russia as a “normal country” while the Russian elite became integrated into the West — and corrupted the Western system from within.

That trade-off, many Western observers hoped, would keep Moscow from stirring up trouble beyond Russia’s borders. How could people whose ill-gotten gains are kept in Western banks and whose children attend Western schools be ill-disposed toward the West?

The survival of Putin’s system is based on a permanent search for internal and external enemies. Ukraine has become the testing ground for a Kremlin that seeks to eliminate the very idea of revolution — not only in Russia but also in the former Soviet bloc — and to force the West to accept its right to do so.

The dismemberment of Ukraine also exposes the mechanism of the Russian matrix, in which foreign policy is the main instrument of domestic agenda. Those worrying only about Russian imperialism are wrong: Land-grabbing and “defending” the Russian-speaking population in other countries are the means to turn Russia into a state at war, making Putin a wartime president and strengthening his position at home.

Putin not only seeks to revisit the results of the end of the Cold War; he also wants a final say in establishing the new world order. Briefly, the Kremlin offers a new trade-off: In return for continued economic benefits for the West, Russia wants Western consent to its interpretation of the rules of the game.

This does not only undermine the Western vision of Kantian perpetual peace. It also creates new traps — for both sides.

On Russia’s side, the Kremlin has appropriated liberal rhetoric to legitimize its intervention in Ukraine. It demands that Kiev reform the Ukrainian constitution and allow for regional referendums on the right to secession and federalization. Meanwhile, however, Russian citizens do not have such rights; advocating for them, in fact, can land one in jail.

So the Kremlin’s external rhetoric is undermining the legitimacy of the Russian regime. There will come a time when Russia’s Tatars will say, “Why can’t we have a right to self-determination?” There will come a time when Russians will ask, “Why can’t we have a right to a referendum and a right to oppose the authorities?” In other words, we are witnessing a situation in which the Kremlin’s bid for survival is turning into a suicidal marathon.

The liberal democracies are not doing much better. Caught off-guard by Putin’s maneuvering, liberal democracies tell the Kremlin that if it stops further aggression, the West just might accept the new status quo. In fact, the April 17 Geneva agreement among the United States, European Union and Russia revealed the West’s inability to stop Russia’s efforts to destabilize Ukraine. Western demands for “de-escalation,” demarcated with fuzzy “red lines,” only provoked Moscow into moving further. By refusing to offer Ukraine real prospects for joining the Euro-Atlantic community through either European Union and/or NATO membership, the West is leaving Ukraine in a gray zone of uncertainty, vulnerable to falling into the Russian orbit.

While the Western sanctions that have been imposed so far have started to bite, they paradoxically strengthen Putin’s “besieged fortress” logic of survival. The Russian leader’s call this week for pro-Russian separatists in Donetsk to put their independence referendum on hold was not a surrender; it is an invitation to Kiev to accommodate the Kremlin’s interests, this time through “dialogue.”

This call for dialogue by a leader who has limited political life in Russia to his own monologue sounds like cognitive dissonance. However, the Kremlin’s goal is more likely pragmatic: to switch to the role of peacemaker and strike a new Faustian bargain with the West, persuading it to agree to Ukrainian limited sovereignty and the right of external forces to teach Ukrainians what is right and what is wrong.

I’ll bet that Western leaders, tired of their Ukrainian headache, might agree with the bargain. And the Kremlin will join the Ukrainian “round table” moderators. Instead of an invader, Putin will be seen as the architect of the new postmodern reality.

Isn’t it hilarious?


The Washington Post
hajkula1 hajkula1 21:02 10.05.2014

Samo su slavili Dan pobede



http://www.nspm.rs/hronika/crna-gora-u-budvi-privedeno-20-rusa-zbog-ugrozavanja-javnog-reda-i-mira-na-dan-pobede.html

Црна Гора: Полиција у Будви привела двадесетак руских држављана због "угрожавања јавног реда и мира" на Дан победе

субота, 10. мај 2014.

Полиција у Будви привела у петак двадесет руских држављана јер су у конвоју од више аутомобила и с истакнутим руским заставама обележили Дан победе над фашизмом.

Руси су у конвоју од девет аутомобила, правећи буку сиренама, кружили Будвом, салутирали и поздрављали пролазнике, пишу подгоричке "Вијести" и напомињу да је на једном од возила било написано "На Берлин", што је алузија на поход руске армије на главни град Немачке 1945, преноси Бета.

Полиција је привела двадесет руских држављана због кршења Закона о јавном реду и миру, односно истицања заставе друге државе на јавном месту, наводе "Вијести" и додају да полиција разматра да ли ће поднети прекршајне пријаве против приведених.

За истицање застава и симбола друге државе на јавном месту изриче се новчана казна до 500 евра или затворска казна у трајању до 30 дана.

У Будви званично живи две стотине Руса, а током лета тај град посети десетак хиљада туриста из Русије.

(РТС)


hajkula1 hajkula1 21:48 10.05.2014

Malo o finim ljudima

Malo o finim ljudima koji su, kako je neko skoro napisao, kako su bolji, pošteniji, vredniji od nas.



Ujka Sem kažnjava i saveznike


(Fridrih Emke)


Amerika nema milosti ni prema sopstvenim saveznicima kada je u pitanju njen interes. Na početku rata protiv Iraka koji Nemačka i Francuska nisu htele da podrže, Sjedinjene Američke Države su ovim zemljama uvele ekonomske sankcije. Još pre početka rata, evropski TV kanal "Euronews" pokazao je slike pojedinih ameriikih "patriota", trgovaca i vlasnika restorana kako ispred svojih radnji na sred ulice prosipaju francusko vino i nemački rizling, ili ih jednostavno izbacuju iz upotrebe po ameriikim restoranima. "Njujork Post", visokotiražni dnevni list pozvao je na bojkot nemačkih proizvoda, a pokrenut je i sajt www.germanystinks.com (u prevodu: Nemačka smrdi) koji je objavljivao spisak alternativnih proizvođača koji mogu da zamene nemačke.

Američki kongresmen Robert Veksler tvrdio je u to vreme da vidi jednu "vrlo duboku pukotinu" u ekonomskim odnosima dve zemlje "koja neće skoro moći da se zakrpi." Mnogi američki privrednici takođe su rešili da se obračunaju sa "neposlušnim Nemcima" pa su krenuli u prodaju nemačkih akcija.

Da bi smanjio štetu, nemački lobi u Americi "Atlantski most" e.V. je u dnevnoj novini "Njujork Tajms" objavio oglas preko cele strane, za koji je platio čak 140.000 dolara. U oglasu se patetično podsećalo na američko-nemačko prijateljstvo u proteklom periodu, posebno u vreme "hladnog rata".

Posle uspešne okupacije Iraka, administracija iz Vašingtona je iz poslova obnove ratom i sankcijama uništene zemlje potpuno isključila nemačke i francuske firme. Velikim ameriičkim korporacijama koje su međusobno delile kolač vredam više milijardi dolara bilo je čak izričito zabranjeno da nemačke firme uzimaju kao podizvođače ili da od njih kupuju robu koja može da se nabavi i u drugim državama.

Bivši ministar spoljnih poslova Henri Kisindžer jednom prilikom je rekao: "Nije lako biti naš neprijatelj, ali je još teže našim saveznicima."


http://www.magazin-tabloid.com/casopis/index.php?id=06&br=310&cl=29


Glasači u zapadnim, takozvanim, civilizovanim državama znaju da žive na račun ostatka sveta, na račun siromašnijih država. Znaju da su bogatiji i da lagodnije žive zbog vojne sile svoje države.




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